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ABSTRACT
This dissertation analyzes key challenges to maximizing the impact of development poli-
cies. It focuses on three sectors - migration, taxation, and education. Each of these sectors
offers massive development potential but is constrained by some combination of information
asymmetry, policy barriers, and limited resources. I study these challenges in a global con-
text with projects in the UAE, Philippines, Pakistan, and the US. I use several context and
question-specific research designs: conducting randomized controlled trials, analyzing natu-
ral experiments, and evaluating policy interventions. I combine survey and administrative
data, with novel identification strategies and statistical techniques to estimate causal effects.
The first chapter studies spousal communication among transnational households –house-
holds where one spouse temporarily migrates for work. Despite regular communication be-
tween spouses, information asymmetry persists in these households. I analyze if this infor-
mation asymmetry is caused by spouses strategically misreporting information to influence
resource allocation in the household. Misreporting, by definition, involves purposefully fal-
sifying information, making it challenging to identify. I address this challenge using a novel
field experiment among Filipino migrants in the UAE and their spouses staying behind in
the Philippines. I find that both migrants and their spouses staying behind have biased
beliefs about each other’s finances and these biases are the result of strategic misreporting.
Spouses staying behind and some subgroups of migrants underreport their income to influ-
ence the remittance decision in their favor. The results show that addressing information
asymmetry requires interventions that increase the ability of spouses to verify and monitor
each other’s reported information. However, the welfare impacts of such interventions are a
priori ambiguous because better information sharing may reduce remittances.
The second chapter, co-authored with Joel Slemrod and Mazhar Waseem, evaluates two
Pakistani programs to study the impact of public disclosure and social recognition of tax
payments on tax compliance. Pakistan began revealing the income tax paid by every tax-
payer in the country from 2012. Simultaneously, another program began recognizing and
rewarding the top 100 tax-paying corporations, partnerships, self-employed individuals, and
wage-earners. We combine publicly disclosed and restricted administrative tax return data
for the universe of tax filers to create an extended panel of tax records from 2006 to 2015.
ix
Using empirical strategies based on name commonness for the public disclosure program
and cutoffs in the social recognition program’s eligibility criteria, we show that both pro-
grams induced strong compliance responses. Our results suggest that such programs can
be important policy levers to mobilize resources, especially in weak-enforcement-capacity
economies.
The third chapter studies the joint educational attainment and migration decisions of
international students choosing to study in the US. Immigration critics argue that interna-
tional students are primarily come to the US for employment and use their student status
to bypass restrictions on employment-based migration. I use exchange rate variations to
analyze these competing educational and employment incentives for potential international
students. A depreciation of the home currency reduces educational incentives by increasing
the relative cost of US education but increases employment incentives by making US in-
come relatively more valuable. I find that the cost of education effect dominates the higher
relative income effect. A depreciation of the home currency reduces the stock and flow of
international students from that country.
x
CHAPTER I
Spousal Communication and Information Sharing:
Evidence from Migrants and their Spouses
Abstract
Do spouses misreport information to each other to influence household decision-making? I
analyze this question in the context of transnational households - where one spouse temporar-
ily migrates for work and resource allocation decisions are made under significant information
asymmetry. While the effects of this information asymmetry are well established, its per-
sistence despite regular communication between spouses remains puzzling. Misreporting, by
definition, involves purposefully falsifying information, making it difficult to identify. I ad-
dress this challenge using a novel field experiment among Filipino migrants in the UAE and
their spouses staying behind in the Philippines. I find that both migrants and their spouses
staying behind have biased beliefs about each other’s finances and these biases are the result
of strategic misreporting. Spouses staying behind underreport their income to migrants by
31 percent. They hide income using the more difficult-to-catch strategy of underreporting
known sources of income instead of hiding income sources altogether. Income is only hidden
when migrants do not communicate about or demand control over the household’s finances.
The results are consistent with an income-sharing model where both spouses have private
information and income hiding is constrained by the threat of punishment.
JEL Classification: D13, D82, J61, O15
Keywords: Asymmetric information, hidden income, migration, remittances
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1.1 Introduction
Although most models of the household assume perfect information (Chiappori, 1988,
1992; Lundberg and Pollak, 1993), recent theoretical and empirical work has shown that
spouses may have private information and may strategically use this information to influence
resource allocation in the household (Ashraf, 2009; Castilla and Walker, 2013; Chen, 2006;
De Laat, 2014). As a result, information sharing - when and how spouses share or conceal
private information, plays a key role in determining household outcomes.
Although private information is a non-trivial concern for all households, it is especially
relevant for transnational households - where one spouse temporarily migrates for work and
sends a considerable portion of their income as remittances to the spouse staying behind.
These remittances are economically significant intra-household transfers and the primary
motivation for most temporary migration.1 However, the remittance decision is made under
considerable information asymmetry as migrants and their spouses staying behind have lim-
ited ability to observe or control each other’s actions. This information asymmetry leads to
migrants sending fewer remittances (Joseph, Nyarko and Wang, 2018; Ambler, 2015), accu-
mulating lower savings (Ashraf et al., 2015), both migrants and their households spending
resources on monitoring each other (De Laat, 2014), and biased beliefs about the returns to
migration (Baseler, 2018; McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman, 2013).
While the effects of information asymmetry are well established, the persistence of in-
formation asymmetry, despite regular communication between migrants and their spouses
staying behind, remains puzzling. While communication can reduce information frictions
(Batista and Narciso, 2018), it can instead create or exacerbate information asymmetry if
spouses purposefully misreport information to each other to influence the remittance decision
in their favor.2
In this paper, I analyze if information asymmetry is caused by migrants and their spouses
strategically misreporting information to each other. First, I document the extent of informa-
tion asymmetry between migrants and their spouses staying behind across multiple margins.
Next, I analyze if this asymmetry is the result of strategic misreporting. The defining char-
acteristic of misreporting is that individuals are purposefully falsifying information making
it inherently difficult to identify. I address this challenge using a novel experimental strategy
to observe misreporting. Finally, I explore factors that exacerbate or mitigate misreporting.
1In 2016, remittances sent to developing countries amounted to USD $429 billion, roughly three times
official development aid (World Bank, 2017).
2Ambler (2015) distinguishes between strategic information asymmetries that are created by strategic
behavior and inadvertent information asymmetries that arise due to communication barriers. Based on
her framework spousal communication can be used to create strategic information asymmetries or reduce
inadvertent information asymmetries.
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My research design is based on the simple idea that if migrants and their spouses strate-
gically misreport information to each other, they will differentially report this information
when it is observable to the other spouse compared to when it is not. I implement this de-
sign in the context of transnational households in the UAE-Philippines migration corridor. I
invite married temporary Filipino migrants in the UAE and their spouses staying behind in
the Philippines to separately participate in a survey. The survey is described to participants
as a research activity to create awareness about the experience of Filipino migrants in the
UAE and their households in the Philippines. In the survey, I collect data on income, ex-
penses, and employment; with the migrant reporting their information in the UAE and the
spouse staying back reporting theirs in the Philippines. I elicit the causal effect of spousal
observability by experimentally varying whether the information reported by an individual in
the survey is observable to their spouse. Participants in the control group are informed that
their responses will be kept private and not shared with their spouses, whereas participants
in the treatment group are informed that their responses will be observable to and shared
with their spouses. Information is shared, based on the treatment status, after all surveys
have been completed. Participants know their treatment status when the information is
collected. If migrants and their spouses staying behind strategically misreport information
to each other, I should observe differences in the information reported by the treatment and
the control groups.
I document four findings. First, both migrants and their spouses staying behind have
biased beliefs about each other’s finances. Migrants underestimate their spouses’ income
and overestimate their spouses’ expenses, whereas spouses staying behind underestimate mi-
grants’ less-observable non-wage benefits. Second, these biases are the result of strategic
misreporting. Spouses staying behind underreport their monthly income by 31 percent (213
dirham or USD $58) when it is observable to the migrant, compared to their reported monthly
income of 685 dirham (USD $186) when it is not observable to the migrant. This income
hiding is even greater when the migrant also participates in the study. Third, misreporting
is greater when information is more difficult to observe and less likely to be verified. Spouses
staying behind hide income on the intensive margin by underreporting known sources of
income instead of reporting zero income which would be easier for migrants to verify as mis-
reporting. Income hiding only occurs when migrants do not demand control over or regularly
communicate about the household’s finances, making them less likely to verify reported in-
formation. Fourth, among both migrants and their spouses staying behind, women are more
likely to hide income. These gender differences appear to be driven by men less frequently
demanding control over and communicating about the household’s finances.
The prior literature on asymmetric information in transnational households is comprised
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of non-experimental and experimental studies, focused on income hiding by the remittance
sender. I expand on this work by first presenting a conceptual framework for and then ro-
bustly analyzing strategic misreporting on both sides of the remittance relationship, across
multiple margins of the households actual finances. The key challenge in identifying strate-
gic misreporting as the cause of information asymmetry in non-experimental settings is that
spousal communication is not observed. These studies must infer strategic misreporting
as the mechanism for other observed outcomes. Using this strategy, Seshan and Zubrickas
(2017) show that wives in India underestimate their husbands’ earnings in Qatar and the
underestimation is associated with lower remittances. Joseph, Nyarko and Wang (2018)
show that remittances from the UAE respond more to observable shocks in migrant’s in-
come than unobservable shocks. Baseler (2018) and McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman (2013)
show that migrant-sending households in Kenya and potential migrants in Tonga, respec-
tively, underestimate the returns to migration despite significant information flows between
migrants and household members. In contrast to these studies, I directly observe spousal
information-sharing. This allows me to cleanly identify strategic misreporting as the cause of
information asymmetry in transnational households, ruling out alternate explanations such
as unintentional information frictions caused by limited communication.
Lab and lab-in-field experiments also provide settings where spousal communication and
decision-making has been directly observed.3 These studies find that migrants respond to
increased information sharing by sending more remittances. Salvadoran migrants in the US
remit more when their choice of how much to remit is revealed to recipients (Ambler, 2015)
and Filipino migrants in Italy remit more when they can label remittances with their intended
purpose (De Arcangelis et al., 2015). However, as these studies accede, their findings may
be limited to decision-making over one-time windfall gains. Households may treat income
from unanticipated lottery winnings differently from their permanent income and the stakes
involved in hiding or sharing these winnings may also be considerably lower. I move this
research agenda forward by analyzing how results from these lab and lab-in-field settings
translate when transnational households share information about their actual finances.
My results are also informative for the design and implementation of financial products
and services for transnational households that leverage information sharing and control.
There is a growing interest in these products that are motivated by the idea that greater
control and information sharing will improve financial decision-making and outcomes but
experimental evaluations have found mixed results.4 Ashraf et al. (2015) show that Salvado-
3Ashraf (2009) and Castilla and Walker (2013) show that in co-residing households, spouses strategically
use private information and lack of communication for personal gain.
4Field experiments have also been used to evaluate the impact of financial literacy and training programs
targeted to transnational households to improve financial behaviors and decision-making. See Seshan and
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ran migrants save more when they have access to bank accounts at home that offer greater
control over savings. However, Ambler, Aycinena and Yang (2015) find no demand for a
remittance product that channels funds directly to education, unless it is bundled with a
subsidy. I find that the strategic behavior these products aim to address is limited to cer-
tain subgroups of transnational households, suggesting that these products would be most
effective when targeted to these households. Importantly, my results also show that these
subgroups can be identified from observable baseline characteristics.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a conceptual framework of the remit-
tance and information sharing decisions. Section 3 provides details of the UAE-Philippines
migration corridor. Section 4 and 5 describe the experimental design and data, respectively.
Section 6 presents the empirical strategy and results. Section 7 discusses other motivations
and strategies for income hiding and section 8 concludes.
1.2 Conceptual Framework: The Remittance & Information Shar-
ing Decision
In this section, I present a conceptual framework of the remittance and information shar-
ing decisions that builds on the frameworks developed by Joseph, Nyarko and Wang (2018)
and Seshan and Zubrickas (2017) to incorporate opportunities of strategic misreporting on
both sides of the remittance relationship. Couples face a trade-off between the benefits of
strategically misreporting income, to influence the remittance decision in their favor, and the
costs of punishment if they are caught lying. Remittances are the result of an income-sharing
contract - increasing in the migrant’s reported net income and decreasing in their spouse’s
reported net income. Although some portion of each spouse’s income is common knowledge,
migrants and their spouses have private information about their realized incomes which they
report to each other. Each spouse can attempt to verify the other’s report and punish the
other spouse if they are caught lying. This framework generates predictions that are distinct
from existing remittance models and can be empirically observed.
1.2.1 The Remittance Contract
Consider a transnational household where the migrant in the host country earns net
income yM >0, while their spouse in the home country earns net income yS. Net income is
income net of some specified subsistence expenditures and I refer to it as income from here
on. Each spouse’s income is comprised of an observable component yoi , which is common
Yang (2014), Gibson, McKenzie and Zia (2012), and Doi, McKenzie and Zia (2014).
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knowledge across spouses, and a hidden component yhi , which is private information for
each spouse, where i = M or S. For migrants, while the terms of their contracts may be
observable and common knowledge; their monthly working hours, bonuses, and consumption
expenditure would be private information. Similarly for spouses staying behind, some portion
of their income would be unobservable to the migrant. Each spouses realized income yi =
yoi + y
h
i , is therefore private information.
The income-sharing contract specifies that the migrant will share part of their income with
their spouse as remittances, while in return, the spouse staying back will manage household
and childcare responsibilities in the home country. This arrangement does not have to be an
explicit contract and can instead be an implicit agreement or a social norm. Both the migrant
and spouse send each other a report of their realized income ỹi. The remittance amount r
is a function of both of their reported incomes, r(ỹM , ỹS). Remittances are increasing in
the migrant’s reported income, as high-income migrants are able and expected to remit
more, and decreasing in the spouse’s reported income, as high-income spouses have lower
demand and need for remittances. Appendix 1.10.1 presents a model where this relationship
is formally derived and shows that it exists for a range of income-sharing contracts with
limited assumptions on the utility functions of migrants and spouses.
As remittances are based on reported information, migrants and spouses can attempt to
verify each other’s reports. Verification is imperfect and succeeds with probability pi(xi,−i, ci,
ỹi, yi) that depends on migrant and spouse specific characteristics xi,−i. Couples that monitor
each other through regular communication about household finances, frequent visits, and
support from relatives and peers have a greater probability of verifying each other’s reports.
Successful verification also depends on the amount spent on verification ci, and the magnitude
of the misreporting (ỹi − yi).5 If upon verification either spouse catches the other lying i.e.
ỹi < yi, they can inflict a punishment, denoted by Pi(ỹi, yi). The punishment may take
the form of social or familial sanctions. In addition, the migrant may punish the spouse by
sending fewer remittances in the future than specified by the contract, while the spouse may
punish the migrant by refusing to carry out the migrant’s specified tasks and responsibilities.
The migrant’s utility is increasing in their income and decreasing in the remittances they
have to send, the probability of being caught lying, and the punishment for lying. The
migrant faces a trade-off between the benefit of underreporting their income and having to
send fewer remittances and the cost of punishment if they are caught lying. The spouse’s
utility on the other hand is increasing in their income and the remittances they receive,
while decreasing with the probability of being caught lying and the punishment for lying.
5An alternate but equivalent setup is that instead of increasing the probability of successful verification,
these factors decrease the ability to keep the hidden portion of income private.
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The spouse faces a similar trade-off between the benefit of underreporting their income and
receiving more remittances and the cost of punishment if they are caught lying. Migrants
and spouses decide how much income to report to each other and how much to spend on
verifying each other’s reported income.
1.2.2 Empirical Predictions from the Framework
This framework generates predictions that are distinct from existing altruism and ex-
change based remittance models (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Rapoport and Docquier, 2006;
Yang, 2011).
First, spouses can directly influence remittances by strategically misreporting informa-
tion to the migrant. Modeling remittances as a function of the spouse’s reported income
incorporates spousal demand for remittances in the framework (see Appendix 1.10.1 for de-
tails of such a model). This demand is an important feature of the remittance relationship
and often a source of pressure on migrants. Migrant-sending households use remittances to
insure against income shocks and therefore demand for remittances is directly impacted by
changes in household income (Yang and Choi, 2007).
In existing exchange-based remittance models the effect of spousal income on remittances
is ambiguous. These models limit the spouse’s role to accepting or rejecting the terms of
an agreement that specifies remittances as some function of only the migrant’s income. In
altruism-based remittances models, spouse’s income negatively affects remittances. However,
if remittances are purely altruistic there are no incentives on either side of the remittance
relationship to hide income.6
Second, migrants can attempt to verify spousal reports at a cost. Migrants can spend
significant resources to monitor their households (De Laat, 2014) and their limited ability to
observe and control the household’s decision-making is an important factor in the remittance
decision (Ashraf et al., 2015). Existing remittance models however limit the verification
decision to the spouse (and limit misreporting to the migrant).
Third, the likelihood of successful verification of spousal reports depends on individual
characteristics and the resources spent on monitoring. In standard remittance models, in-
come verification is perfect and incurs a fixed cost. The only choice for migrants is whether
or not to incur the cost of verification.7 However, couple’s ability to monitor each other
6Altruism-based models define the migrant’s utility as a function of the household’s consumption, which
in turn is a function of the household’s income. However, to allow for spouses to strategically influence the
remittance decision requires the additional assumption that spouses are not altruistic and they know that
the migrant is altruistic.
7Joseph, Nyarko and Wang (2018) modify the standard model by allowing for two types of income with
their respective verification costs, thereby also allowing households to choose which income to verify.
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varies based on characteristics such as the size of their networks and the frequency of com-
munication.
Finally, the relevant parameter in the remittance decision is net income, implying that
both income and expenses can be misreported to impact remittances. Although this specifi-
cation is not unique to my framework (see Seshan and Zubrickas (2017), Joseph, Nyarko and
Wang (2018)), I highlight it here because the empirical research on misreporting has predom-
inantly focused on income hiding. Overreporting expenses, which based on the conceptual
framework has the same impact as income hiding, has not been analyzed before.
1.3 Context: Filipino Migrants in the UAE
In this section, I describe features of the UAE-Philippines temporary migration corridor
that are important to studying communication among transnational households.
1.3.1 Immigrants in the UAE
The UAE provides the relevant host country institutional settings - a large remittance-
sending migrant population, immigration policies that lead to the creation of transnational
households, and a labor market that generates income fluctuations which migrants can strate-
gically misreport. Some combination of these institutional settings is present in all countries
that host temporary employment-based migrants.
The UAE is one of the largest temporary migration destinations and remittance sources
in the world. 88 percent of the UAE’s 9.6 million population are migrants. The migrant
population has increased substantially over the last decades, from 3.3 million in 2005 to an
estimated 8.6 million in 2019 (United Nations, 2019). The remittances these migrants sent
amounted to 10.7 percent of the UAE’s GDP in 2018 and made it the second-largest source
of outward remittances (World Bank, 2018a).
Almost all migration to the UAE is temporary and employment-based. The immigration
policy, known as kefala or sponsorship, is widely practiced in the Middle East. Visas are tied
to employment status with a specific employer and do not offer any paths to legal permanent
residence or citizenship. Employment contracts are only two years long but can be repeatedly
renewed with the consent of both parties. When a contract ends or is terminated migrants
must either obtain a new contract or return to their home country within 30 days.
The UAE’s immigration policies and high cost of living lead to the creation of transna-
tional households. Immigration requirements based on income and occupation prevent low-
income migrants from inviting their spouses and children to the UAE - creating transna-
tional households. Male migrants must have a monthly income of at least 4,000 dirham
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(USD $1,089) to invite their spouses and children, while female migrants face stricter re-
quirements.8 Even when these income and employment conditions are not binding, the high
cost of living in the UAE, relative to migrants’ home countries, also dissuades them from
inviting their spouses and children. Female migrants are again disproportionately impacted
by these factors. Husbands cannot work in the UAE based on their wives’ visa status and
must acquire their own work visas. In contrast, wives of male migrants can work in the UAE
based on their husbands’ visa status.
Migrants working in the UAE experience fluctuations in their monthly income despite
specific contracts. These fluctuations create additional opportunities to strategically misre-
port income that would not be present if incomes remained stable over the full contract cycle.
Employment contracts are required to state the employee’s remuneration, however, this is
often only specified as the minimum required working hours and the corresponding total
monthly wage. Joseph, Nyarko and Wang (2018) use administrative payroll data to show
that migrants in the UAE experience substantial fluctuations in monthly wages caused by
variations in working hours and overtime pay. Anecdotal evidence from focus groups suggests
that migrants also experience income fluctuations due to delayed or missed paychecks.
1.3.2 Emigrants from the Philippines
The Philippines has a large, gender-balanced emigrant population. The remittances they
send are a key component of the country’s development policy and a significant proportion
of Filipino households rely on these remittances to sustain themselves.
The Philippines has one of the largest emigrant populations in the world. In 2018, there
were 2.3 million Filipino migrants (known locally as Overseas Filipino Workers or OFWs)
worldwide. These migrants remitted USD $32.8 billion in 2017, making the Philippines the
third-largest remittance-receiving country in the world. According to the Filipino govern-
ment’s nationally-representative Family Income and Expenditure Survey of 2009, 26 percent
of households received remittances from abroad. The UAE was the second-largest destina-
tion and source of remittances for Filipino migrants, accounting for 15.7 percent of the total
Filipino migrant population and 13 percent of the total remittances to the Philippines in
2017 (World Bank, 2018b). A key feature of Filipino migrants is their gender composition.
In 2020, 56 percent of Filipino migrants were women. This is a much higher proportion of
female migrants than most migrant-sending developing countries and allows the analysis of
8Female teachers, engineers, doctors, or other medical professionals have the same income requirements
as men; however, women employed elsewhere are required to have a minimum monthly income of 10,000
dirham (USD $2,722) and even then each petition is decided on a case by case basis by the UAE immigration
department. The income threshold for each category is reduced to 3,000 dirham (USD $817) or 8,000 dirham
(USD $2,178) respectively if the migrant’s accommodation is provided in-kind by their employer.
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the interaction of gender with migration and remittance decisions.
1.4 Experimental Design
The experiment is designed to address the main challenges of studying information shar-
ing in transnational households; observing communication about the household’s actual fi-
nances among spouses spread across two countries. The experimental design is based on the
simple idea that if couples strategically misreport information to each other, they will dif-
ferentially report this information when it is observable to their spouse compared to when it
is not observable. I implement this idea by separately surveying migrants and their spouses
about their respective finances. In the survey, I experimentally vary if an individual’s re-
sponses are observable to their spouse and use this variation to identify if spouses strategically
misreport information to each other.
1.4.1 Sample
The study sample is comprised of migrants working in the UAE and their spouses living
in the Philippines. This transnational sample allows me to analyze strategic misreporting
from both sides of the remittance relationship.
The sample was drawn from a subject pool of participants of a separate study on the
remittance behavior of migrants.9 The subject pool consisted of migrant workers from the
Philippines living and working in Dubai, UAE. Migrants were recruited between September
and December 2018 via face-to-face intercepts in locations frequented by Filipino migrants
in Dubai.10 Migrants who expected to continue working in the UAE for the following 12
months and agreed to participate were enrolled in the subject pool. At enrollment, migrants
were administered a baseline survey that collected information on demographics, remittance
behavior, and contact details of their remittance recipients. I use this baseline data to identify
and invite my study sample and to analyze selection into the study and heterogeneity in
treatment effects.
From this subject pool of Filipino migrants, I invited all married migrants, whose spouses
were living in the Philippines and who had sent remittances to their spouse’s household in
the last year, to participate in this study. Separately I also invited their spouses in the
Philippines to participate. These criteria produced an invited sample of 492 couples (984
9The subject pool was recruited as part of De Arcangelis and Yang (2019). Details of the subject pool
recruitment are described in appendix 1.10.2
10The Filipino community in Dubai is highly concentrated in the Satwa and Rigga neighborhoods. Recruit-
ment locations included metro stations, Filipino restaurants, retail stores, and remittance service provider
branches in these neighborhoods.
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individuals; half in the UAE, and half in the Philippines). Of these invited individuals,
159 migrants and 156 spouses participated in the study - a take-up rate of around 32%
for both groups. This included 94 matched couples (both the migrant and their spouse
participated), 65 cases where only the migrant participated, and 62 cases where only the
spouse participated. Figure 1.1 shows the time-line of project activities along with the
sample size at each stage.
1.4.2 Experimental Conditions
The experimental conditions were designed to identify strategic misreporting of the
transnational household’s actual finances.
Migrants and their spouses were invited to participate in a survey that was marketed as
a research activity to improve information and awareness about the experience of Filipino
migrant workers in the UAE and their migrant-sending households in the Philippines. In
the survey, respondents were asked information about their finances and employment, and
their beliefs about their spouse’s finances; with the migrant reporting their information in
the UAE and the spouse reporting theirs in the Philippines. Participants were informed
that summary results of the data collected from the surveys would be shared with them
when the study was completed. The surveys were conducted over the phone, separately for
both migrants and their spouses between January and April 2019. Participants were aware
that their spouses would also be separately invited to participate in the study. However, no
details about their spouse’s survey activity including; when they would be contacted, their
participation status, or the questions they would be asked, were shared with participants.
To elicit the causal effect of spousal observability the experimental conditions varied
whether an individual’s responses to the relevant survey sections were observable to their
spouse. During the survey, participants were first asked to report their beliefs about their
spouse’s finances. I use this information to document information asymmetry among spouses
about each other’s finances. After this section, each participant’s treatment status was
revealed to them. Participants in the treatment group were informed that the following
survey section was designed as a joint activity with their spouse and that their responses
in the following section would be shared with and observable to their spouse. In contrast,
participants in the control group were informed that the following survey section was a
separate activity for each spouse and that their responses would be kept private. Additional
details of the experimental protocol including the treatment and control scripts read by
surveyors to introduce the experimental survey section are described in Appendix 1.10.3.
In the experimental survey section, migrants and spouses reported their average monthly
income and expenses. To ensure respondents did not report the transnational household’s
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combined finances, migrants were specifically asked to report their income and expenses in
the UAE while spouses were asked to report theirs in the Philippines. In addition, migrants
were asked to exclude any remittances they sent from their reported expenses, and spouses
were asked to exclude any remittances they received from their reported income. Respon-
dents had the option to report information in either dirhams or philippine pesos. For the
analysis, the responses have all been standardized to dirhams based on the exchange rate at
the time of the survey to allow for comparisons.
Participants responded to the experimental survey section, which asked questions about
their finances, knowing whether or not the information they were reporting would be shared
with and observable to their spouse. Any difference in the information reported by the
treatment and control groups is therefore the causal effect of spousal observability. The
experimental design allows me to identify strategic misreporting using self-reported data,
without observing participants’ true finances (or the difference between their self-reported
and true finances). Identification is driven by the difference in self-reported information
when it is observable and not observable to the spouse. Any measurement issues related to
self-reporting would equally affect the treatment and control groups and therefore not bias
my results.
Random assignment was done at the couple level using the baseline survey data and was
not stratified by any pretreatment characteristics.11 Half of the invited participants were
randomly assigned to the treatment group. Treatment status was assigned to all invited
participants before they were contacted. Each participant was administered their treatment
status specific survey. Participants were not informed that there were multiple treatment




Table 1.1 shows summary statistics from the migrant baseline surveys for all invited
migrants, participating migrants, and participating migrants by their treatment status. By
design, all migrants in the sample are married. They are on average 37 years old and have
two children. 69 percent of the invited migrant sample are men. Although less than a third
of the sample is female, the proportion of women among Filipino migrants in the UAE is
11Treatment assignment was done at the couple level to avoid any household conflict from spouses being
assigned different treatment status.
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substantially higher than the proportion of women among migrants from other countries.12
Migrants whose spouses are in the Philippines generally have low incomes because of the
income and employment requirements for family immigration described in section 1.3.1. A
majority of the sample earned between 1,500 dirham (USD $408) and 4,500 dirham (USD
$1,225) per month. (The income threshold for family immigration for male migrants and
some female migrants is 4,000 dirham (USD $1,088) and 10,000 dirham (USD $2,722), respec-
tively.) Migrants are primarily employed in the services, sales, and construction sectors. In
terms of remittance behavior, all migrants have sent remittances to their spouses in the past
year. 90 percent of migrants send remittances to their households every month and in almost
all cases their spouse is their primary remittance recipient. The average monthly remittance
is around 1,555 dirhams (USD $423) which corresponds to 40 percent of migrant’s monthly
income.13 This matches findings in other studies that show that migrants with transnational
households send a significant portion of their incomes as remittances. Migrants also report
sending remittances to on average one other recipient over the last year. Other recipients
include parents, siblings, in-laws, and other relatives.
Migrants are generally well settled in the UAE having lived there for an average of seven
years. As employment contracts are two years long, the average stay of seven years implies
that migrants stay for multiple contract cycles, either renewing with the same employer
or switching employers. Contracts often include in-kind benefits such as food, housing,
and annual flight tickets for migrants to visit their households. Most migrants visit their
household in the Philippines once every year and the average duration since their last visit
at the time of the survey was around two years.
To understand the level of communication and control over the household’s finances
at baseline, migrants were asked about their financial decision-making. Migrants report
discussing household budgets with their spouses on average once per month. 43 percent of
migrants say they would like more control over how their spouse spends remittances, while
around half report that they instruct their spouses on how to spend remittances.
1.5.2 Selection and Balance
I test for selection into the study and selection into treatment to address concerns about
external and internal validity of the experiment. I do not find evidence of either type of
selection based on observables and discuss below how selection on unobservables may impact
my treatment effect estimates.
12Other migrants primarily from South Asia are predominantly male. As a result, UAE had the highest
gender imbalance in the world in 2015, with a male/female ratio of 2.2
13Based on the average income reported by the control group in the experimental survey. In the baseline
survey migrants only reported their income range.
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Individuals who hide or misreport information to their spouses may be less likely to
participate in the study regardless of their treatment status. Participation involves reporting
information to a research team that will also be in contact with their spouses. This may
be enough of a deterrent from participating for anyone actively seeking to hide information
from their spouse, causing me to underestimate misreporting. Alternately, individuals who
are seeking information about their spouse’s finances may participate in the study to access
more information. Selection on this margin, however, is not associated with a participant’s
own misreporting and would not bias my estimated treatment effect. Although if these
individuals are also more misinformed about their spouse’s finances, I may overestimate
information asymmetry at baseline.
I check for selection into the study using the migrant baseline data by comparing all
migrants who were invited to participate in the study to those who participated. Columns
(1) and (2) on table 1.1 show the means for the invited migrant sample and those who agreed
to participate. Column (3) shows the p-value from the two-sided t-test of the equivalence of
means of those who did and did not participate. I find no evidence of selection into the study
based on observable remittance behavior or measures of communication and control over the
household’s finances. The only statistically significant difference is that participants were less
likely to be male than non-participants and I control for this in my regression specifications.
Selection may also be based on treatment status. Individuals who want to hide infor-
mation may be less likely to participate if they are assigned to the treatment group where
survey responses would be shared with their spouse, again causing me to underestimate
misreporting. As the treatment status was assigned before contacting migrants, I test for
and find no evidence of selection into the study based on treatment assignment. Columns
(4) and (5) of table 1.1 show group means by treatment status and column (6) shows the
p-value from the two-sided t-test of the equivalence of these means.
Although I do not have baseline data for spouses, as a proxy, I use the migrant baseline
to test for selection among migrants whose spouses participated in the study. The results
are shown in table 1.11 which replicates table 1.1 for the sample of migrants whose spouses
participated. I again do not find evidence of selection into the study or treatment.
1.6 Empirical Analysis and Results
Using a combination of descriptive and experimental results I show that there is significant
information asymmetry between migrants and spouses and this asymmetry is driven by
strategic misreporting. Information asymmetry and strategic misreporting is greater when
information is more difficult to observe and less likely to be verified. Spouses and certain
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subgroups of migrants strategically underreport income to influence the remittance decision
in their favor. Spouses hide income on the intensive margin by underreporting known sources
of income instead of reporting zero income which would be easier for migrants to catch.
Income is only hidden when migrants do not demand control over or regularly communicate
about the household’s finances, making them less likely to verify reported information.
1.6.1 Descriptive Analysis
1.6.1.1 Remittances and Net Income
First I show that remittances are increasing in the migrant’s net income and decreasing in
the spouse’s net income, creating incentives for misreporting net income on both sides of the
remittance relationship and validating a key feature of the conceptual framework presented
in section 1.2.
Figure 1.2 shows scatter plots and the accompanying linear regression lines for monthly
remittances plotted against the migrant’s and spouse’s reported net income. Remittances are
reported in the migrant baseline survey, while the net income for each spouse is the difference
between their reported monthly income and expenses in the experimental survey. The figures
are drawn using data from only the control group, as income and expenses reported by the
treatment group are affected by the treatment condition.
Panel A shows that remittances are positively correlated with migrant’s net income. The
linear regression line has a slope of 0.4, implying that migrants remit 40 percent of their
reported net income and by underreporting net income they can decrease the amount of re-
mittances they have to send. Panel B shows that remittances are negatively correlated with
spouse’s net income. The slope of the regression line in -0.5, implying that for each additional
dirham of reported spousal net income, remittances decrease by 0.50 dirham. By underre-
porting net income spouses can increase the remittances they receive from migrants. Panel
B also shows that a majority of spouses have negative net income. Their income, excluding
any remittances they receive, is less than their expenses; highlighting that remittances are
essential for these spouses to sustain their households in the Philippines.
1.6.1.2 Information Asymmetry
Next, I document the extent of information asymmetry between migrants and spouses.
Prior work has primarily focused on information asymmetry of migrant’s income among
migrant-sending households (Baseler, 2018; Seshan and Zubrickas, 2017; Joseph, Nyarko
and Wang, 2018). However, as the conceptual framework showed, both migrants and spouses
have incentives to strategically misreport information to each other. In addition, the rele-
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vant parameter for the remittance decision is reported income net of expenses. Overstating
expenses has the same impact as hiding income and is therefore also a plausible margin for
strategic misreporting. By focusing only on income we may underestimate the true scope of
information asymmetry in the transnational household. I expand on the literature by docu-
menting information asymmetry; first, across multiple margins, and second, on both sides of
the remittance relationship. I find that both migrants and spouses have biased beliefs about
each other’s finances. Migrants underestimate spouses’ income and overestimate spouses’
expenses, whereas spouses underestimate migrants’ in-kind employment benefits.
In the experimental survey, in addition to reporting their own finances, migrants and
spouses reported their beliefs about each other’s finances. To measure information asym-
metry, the comparison of each spouse’s reported finances with the other’s beliefs is visually
shown in figures 1.3 and 1.4, and statistically analyzed in table 1.2. Again, the comparison
is made using data from only the control group.14
Figure 1.3 shows spouse’s beliefs about the migrant’s finances. Spouses underestimate
migrant’s income by 16 percent (630 dirham or USD $172) and overestimate migrant’s ex-
penses by 15 percent (183 dirham or USD $50). Although these differences are large, because
of significant variation in these measures they are not statistically significant. Migrants and
spouses were also asked to report if migrants receive non-wage benefits. These benefits are a
common and sizable component of migrant remuneration in the UAE, however, compared to
wage income they are more difficult for spouses to observe. Panel II shows that spouses are
not aware that migrants receive in-kind food, housing, transport and health care benefits,
and these differences are all statistically significant (see table 1.2 for comparison on means).
Figure 1.4 shows information asymmetry among migrants about their spouse’s finances.
Despite the literature’s focus on biased beliefs among migrant-sending households, I find
strong evidence of biased beliefs among migrants. Migrants underestimate spouse’s income
and overestimate spouse’s expenses by 29.5 and 22.3 percent respectively. Despite similar
patterns to figure 1.3, these differences are larger and also statistically significant in both
cases, highlighting that information asymmetry is greater among migrants. Figure 1.4 also
shows that on average spouses’ incomes, excluding any remittances they receive, are less than
their expenses. Migrants are aware of and overestimate this gap in spouses’ net income.
These results show the importance of analyzing information asymmetry across multiple
margins from both sides of the remittance relationship. They also raise the question - why
do migrants and spouses have biased beliefs about each other’s finances? The directions
of the bias (underestimating income and overestimating expenses) support the claim that
14Beliefs were elicited before the treatment assignment was revealed and are therefore not affected by
treatment status.
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these biases are caused by strategic behavior to influence the remittance decision. However,
this evidence is only suggestive. Biased beliefs may exist for many reasons including a lack
of communication or interest in financial issues. Money and finances are difficult topics to
discuss for any household so biases may persist due to communication frictions without any
strategic motivations. To causally identify whether these biased beliefs are the result of
strategic misreporting I now analyze the results of the spousal observability experiment.
1.6.2 Experimental Analysis & Results
1.6.2.1 Specification
To identify strategic misreporting I estimate the following OLS regressions in the exper-
imental results that follow:
Yi = α + βTi + γXi + εi (1.1)
Yi is the outcome of interest, either reported income or expenses. In the main speci-
fication, both outcomes are measured as average monthly amounts in dirhams. Ti is the
treatment status indicator, Xi is a vector of controls from the baseline survey and εi is the
error term adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The coefficient β is the average difference between
the outcome when an individual’s response is observable and not-observable to their spouse.
I run regressions, separately for migrants and spouses to allow for heterogeneous responses
to treatment, both without and with controls to improve the precision of my treatment esti-
mates. I also report randomization inference p-values for the treatment estimates from 5,000
replications of the treatment assignment. All controls are from the migrant baseline survey
and include demographic characteristics, baseline income-category dummies, and measures
of monitoring and remittance behavior.
1.6.2.2 Main Results
Spouses hide income by strategically underreporting it when it is observable to the mi-
grant. Income is hidden on the intensive margin by underreporting known sources of income
and hiding is greater when the migrant also participates in the study, reinforcing the result
that underreporting is driven by spousal observability. I do not find evidence of income
misreporting by migrants. Neither migrants nor spouses misreport expenses.
Table 1.3 shows the treatment effect of migrant observability on spouse’s reported monthly
income and expenses. Columns (1) and (2) show the results for reported income without
and with controls, respectively. Spouses in the treatment group underreport their income
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by 213 dirham (USD $58) which represents a 31 percent decrease from the control group’s
average income of 685 dirham (USD $186). The magnitude of the treatment effect almost
exactly matches the magnitude of the migrants’ bias in their belief about spouses’ income
(migrants underestimate spouses’ income by 200 dirham or USD $54), supporting the claim
that the information asymmetry is driven by strategic misreporting. In terms of the remit-
tance relationship, this underreporting of income is associated with a 107 dirham (USD $29)
or a 7 percent increase in monthly remittances, based on the relationship between spouse’s
reported net income and remittances shown in section 1.6.1.1.
Columns (3) and (4) show the results for reported expenses, without and with controls,
respectively. I do not find evidence that spouses strategically misreport their expenses. This
is not surprising because for both migrants and spouses, despite being a plausible margin
for underreporting net income, overreporting expenses is likely to invite greater scrutiny and
verification from the other spouse. Neither migrants nor spouses want to reward each other
for greater spending. As a result of this moral hazard, reported expenses are more likely
to be verified and any misreporting of expenses is more likely to be caught. Expenses are
therefore not the preferred margin for misreporting net income.
Table 1.4 shows the results of spousal observability for migrants. Migrants in the control
group reported an average monthly income of 3,809 dirham (USD $1,037) and expenses
of 1,201 dirham (USD $327). Although for income the treatment coefficients are around
6 percent of the control mean, because of the large variation I do not find statistically
significant evidence that migrants underreport income when it is observable to their spouse.
These results persist after controlling for migrant baseline characteristics in columns (2).
Similar to spouses, I do not find evidence that migrants misreport expenses.
The migrant results match the descriptive findings of limited information asymmetry
among spouses about the migrant’s finances. Spouse’s beliefs were not statistically differ-
ent from the migrant’s reported income and expenses, providing suggestive evidence that
migrants were either not misreporting information on these margins, or any misreporting
was limited in magnitude. This descriptive evidence is corroborated by the experimental
evidence that also does not show strategic misreporting by migrants.
To further analyze the relationship between misreporting and spousal observability I
leverage the variation in migrant and spousal participation in the study. My sample includes
migrants whose spouses did not participate, spouses whose migrants did not participate, and
matched couples, where both the migrant and spouse participated. If an individual knows
that their spouse is not participating in the study, treatment assignment will not affect
spousal observability as reported information will remain private regardless of an individual’s
treatment status. Similarly, if an individual in the treatment group knows that their spouse
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is participating in the study, they may perceive a greater likelihood of their information
being shared with and observable to their spouse.15 While I do not inform individuals about
their spouses’ participation status, they may share this information directly. As a result, the
intensity of the spousal observability treatment should be higher for matched couples and
lower for cases where only the migrant or spouse participates.
To test for such a response, I re-estimate the treatment effects restricting the sample to
matched couples - cases where both the migrant and their spouse participated in the study
and therefore the effect of spousal observability should be greater. The results for spouses
using the sample of matched couples are shown in table 1.5. Spouses hide more income when
the migrant is also participating in the study. The treatment effect on reported income is
larger in this subsample - 310 dirhams (USD $84) compared to 213 dirhams (USD $58) for
the full sample. For expenses, I again do not find any evidence of misreporting by spouses.
Table 1.6 shows matched couple results for migrants. The estimates are similar to the results
for the full sample shown in table 1.4 and I again do not find evidence of strategic income or
expense misreporting by migrants. The greater impact of participating as a matched couple
on spouses may be driven by spouses being surveyed after migrants (see figure 1.1 for the
project time-line). Although participants were not informed of the survey order, spouses
are more likely to know the migrant’s participation status because migrants were surveyed
before them.
Spouses can hide income at the intensive margin, by underreporting but still reporting
positive income from a source known by the migrant, or at the extensive margin, by reporting
zero income and hiding income sources altogether. Based on the conceptual framework,
income is less likely to be hidden when it is easier to verify. Verifying the existence of an
income source is easier than verifying the amount of income earned from a known source.
Income hiding at the extensive margin is therefore more likely to be caught because peers
and other family members can also observe and verify the spouse’s income sources for the
migrant. In contrast, income hiding at the intensive margin is difficult to verify, even for
other family members.
I test for and find that income hiding is driven by the intensive margin in figure 1.5 and
table 1.7. Figure 1.5 shows the cumulative distribution of reported income, separately for
migrants and spouses by treatment group. Panel A shows that in both the treatment and
control groups about a third of spouses report zero income i.e. the remittances they receive
are their only reported income source. Spouses do not hide income at the extensive margin
15Although participants in the treatment group were not told that the sharing of information with their
spouse is conditional on their spouse’s participation, they may still believe that information sharing is more
likely if their spouse participates.
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by differentially reporting zero income when it is observable to the migrant. The figure
also shows that the distribution of spouses’ reported incomes when it is observable to the
migrant is always lower than the distribution when it is not observable to the migrant; i.e., the
distribution when the response is observable stochastically dominates the distribution when
the response is not observable. Table 1.7 presents an alternate specification, replicating the
spouse’s results from the main specification in table 1.3 with the outcome variable measured
as the log of reported monthly income in dirhams. This specification drops spouses that
report zero income, focusing exclusively on misreporting on the intensive margin. The results
remain similar to table 1.3. Spouses underreport their income by 46 log points when it is
observable to the migrant, showing that income hiding is driven primarily by the intensive
margin of underreporting known sources of income which is harder for migrants to verify.16
1.6.3 Heterogeneity & Mechanisms: Who is Hiding and Why?
Based on the conceptual framework presented in section 1.2 strategic misreporting is
motivated by the benefits of hiding income and constrained by the likelihood and punish-
ment from being caught. It is therefore instructive to examine whether income hiding varies
by characteristics associated with greater benefits from hiding and an increased ability of
couples to verify each other’s reported income. In this section, I analyze treatment effect
heterogeneity by measures of communication and control over the household’s finances, re-
mittance behavior, and gender. I find that spouses only hide income when migrants do not
demand control over or regularly communicate about the household’s finances, making them
less likely to verify reported information. High remittance sending migrants hide income
to avoid sending even more remittances. Among both migrants and spouses, women are
more likely to hide income. These gender differences also appear to be driven by men less
frequently demanding control over and communicating about the household’s finances.
1.6.3.1 Specification
I estimate the following modified regression:
Yi = α + βTi + λ(Ti × xi) + γXi + εi (1.2)
Ti × xi is the interaction between the treatment status and trait xi. The coefficient β is
now the average treatment effect for individuals that do not have trait x, λ is the difference
16Appendix table 1.12 shows the results for the log of migrant’s reported monthly income and finds results
similar to the main results in table 1.4. The results for the log of migrant’s income and log of both migrant’s
and spouse’s expenses are less informative because they are never zero.
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between the average treatment effect of individuals that have and do not have trait x, and the
sum of β and λ is the average treatment effect for individuals with trait x. I run regressions
separately for migrants and spouses for each trait x. All regressions include the vector of
controls X which always includes the main effect of trait x.
The results are shown in table 1.8 for spouses and table 1.9 for migrants. Each column
is a separate regression, reporting the coefficient of the treatment indicator, the interaction
of the treatment indicator with each trait, and the sum of the treatment and interaction
coefficients. To allow comparisons, the first columns reproduces the main income results
for spouses and migrants from column (2) in table 1.3 and 1.4 respectively. I again report
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and randomization inference p-values.
1.6.3.2 Communication and control over finances
First I use three measures of the migrant’s financial communication and control to analyze
the impact of increased verification on income hiding.
A growing literature highlights that because of differences in the spending preferences of
migrants and their spouses, migrants send fewer remittances when they cannot control how
those remittances are spent (Ashraf et al., 2015; Yang, 2011; Chin, Karkoviata and Wilcox,
2015). I test whether migrants wanting more control over remittance spending impacts
income hiding by migrants and spouses. The trait control is a dummy equal to one if at
baseline the migrant reports wanting more control over how remittances are spent by their
spouse.
Column (2) of table 1.8 shows that income hiding by spouses is entirely driven by spouses
of migrants who do not demand more control over remittance spending. These spouses
underreport their income by 573 dirham (USD $156) when it is observable to the migrant.
On the other hand, spouses of migrants who demand control over remittance spending, do
not underreport income when it is observable to the migrant. Migrants who want more
control over remittance spending may communicate this demand to their spouses, alerting
them to increased scrutiny from the migrant over the household’s finances. This scrutiny
would increase the likelihood of the migrant catching any misreporting, deterring spouses
from hiding income. In contrast, spouses of migrants who do not report wanting more control
and therefore do not face increased scrutiny, hide income. For migrants, column (2) of table
1.9 shows that wanting more control over remittance spending is not associated with greater
income hiding.
I now move from analyzing cases where migrants want more financial control to cases
where they exercise more financial control. The most basic form of financial control that
migrants can exercise is communicating about the household’s finances with their spouses -
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asking and instructing spouses about where money is coming from and where it should be
spent. In columns (3) and (4) of tables 1.8 and 1.9, I test whether increased communica-
tion about household finances impacts income misreporting by both spouses and migrants.
Instruct and budget are dummies equal to one if at baseline the migrant reports instructing
their spouse on how to use remittances and if the migrant discusses the household budget
with their spouse more frequently than the median number of times (once every two months),
respectively.
Table 1.8 shows that increased instruction and communication about finances from the
migrant limits misreporting by spouses. The likelihood of the spouse’s misreporting being
caught is higher when the migrant regularly communicates about the household’s finances.
As a result, income hiding is entirely driven by spouses of migrants who do not exercise
these traits. Spouses of migrants who do not instruct their spouses on remittance spending
and less frequently discuss the household budget, underreport their income by 576 dirham
(USD $157) and 597 dirham (USD $163) respectively. Underreporting income is only a
beneficial strategy, as I find, when the migrant does not exercise control through communi-
cation. For migrants both measures are associated with lower misreporting, suggesting that
increased communication also deters the migrant from hiding income. However, given the
large variation in migrant’s reported income, these effects are not statistically significant.
These three measures of communication and control are highly correlated with each other
and proxy for the household’s underlying relationship dynamics. Couples who have shared
financial goals and actively communicate about and jointly make financial decisions are less
likely to resort to income hiding to achieve their goals. These are important findings because
they show that strategic income hiding is limited to certain subgroups of transnational
households, that can be identified by observable baseline characteristics. This can improve
the targeting and effectiveness of financial products and services for transnational households
that leverage information sharing and control to impact financial decision-making.
1.6.3.3 Remittance Behavior
Based on the conceptual framework presented in section 1.2, income is primarily hidden
to impact the remittance relationship, to either avoid or induce more remittances. I use two
measures of remittance behavior to analyze its interaction with income hiding; amount is
the average monthly remittances in dirham that migrants report sending to their spouses at
baseline and median is an indicator equal to one if migrants report sending greater than the
median monthly remittance amount of 1450 dirham (USD $395). The results for spouses
and migrants are shown in column (5) and (6) of tables 1.8 and 1.9.
Both measures show that migrants that send higher levels of remittances underreport
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their income when it is observable by their spouse. For each additional dirham remitted,
income is underreported by 0.77 dirham, and migrants who send higher than the median
remittance underreport their income by 1,304 dirham (USD $355). This represents 34 percent
of the income of the overall control group and 23 percent of the income of high remittance
senders in the control group. For spouses, I find some evidence that those who receive low
levels of remittances underreport their income to induce migrants to send more.
Income hiding by migrants that send higher remittances may be driven by an income
effect. Higher remittances are associated with higher levels of income. At these income
levels, migrants may be able to send a base level of remittances and still have significant
money left over to hide, increasing the benefits from hiding it.17 As my sample of migrants
is primarily low-income this may also explain why I do not find evidence of income hiding
by migrants on average. In addition, migrants that send higher levels of remittances may
also face higher unmet demand for remittances from their spouses. This would encourage
income hiding by increasing the likelihood that additional reported income would have to be
shared.
1.6.3.4 Gender
Gender is an essential component of any analysis of household decision-making. However,
the main challenge in analyzing the role of gender in transnational households has been the
lack of gender balance among migrants (and spouses) in most settings. This makes it difficult
to disentangle the impact of the role of each spouse in the transnational household as either
the remittance sender or recipient, from their gender. In my sample, a third of migrants
and two-thirds of spouses are women, allowing me to analyze the interaction of gender with
strategic misreporting for both migrants and their spouses.
The trait male in column (7) of table 1.8 and 1.9 identifies male spouses and male
migrants, respectively. I find that among both migrants and spouses, women underreport
their income when it is observable to their spouse, whereas for male spouses and migrants
the treatment effect of spousal observability is not statistically different from zero. Female
spouses underreport their income by 323 dirham (USD $88) when it is observable to the
migrant. This represents around 47 percent decrease from both the average reported income
of the overall control group of 685 dirham (USD $186) and of women in the control group
of 675 dirham (USD $183). Female migrants underreport their income by 578 dirham (USD
$157) when it is observable to their spouse. This represents a 15 percent decrease from the
average reported income of the overall control group of 3,809 dirham (USD $1,037) and a 17
17This matches Seshan and Zubrickas (2017) finding that information asymmetry of migrant’s income
among spouses, increases with the migrant’s income.
23
percent decrease from the average reported income of women in the control group of 3,361
dirham (USD $915).
I use the migrant baseline data to further analyze gender differences in demographics,
measures of communication and control over the household’s finances, and remittance behav-
ior. The results are shown in table 1.10. Female migrants earn lower incomes and send fewer
remittances than male migrants. These differences stem from differences in employment -
female migrants are less likely to be employed in the food-service and construction sectors
and more likely to be employed in the personal service sector. However, these differences are
unlikely to be the cause of greater income hiding by women. Lower incomes are more likely
to be associated with less income hiding because low-income migrants have limited ability to
send remittances and therefore limited incentives to hide their income (as discussed in sec-
tion 1.6.3.3 Remittance Behavior). In addition, the findings of differential treatment effects
for women among both migrants and spouses suggest that these differences are driven by
factors that are not specific to the women’s role in the transnational household as remittance
sender or recipient and are instead broader.
Women’s income hiding may instead be driven by gender norms about income and man-
agement of household finances. Filipino women are more likely to be the financial managers
of the household, regardless of their income or occupation status, and are therefore more
likely to want control of their husband’s finances. Ashraf (2009) documents this norm for
co-residing Filipino households and table 1.10 shows this norm persists for transnational
Filipino households. Among migrants, women are more likely to instruct their spouse on
remittance spending and more likely to want more control over the household’s finances.
As shown in section 1.6.3.2, these traits limit misreporting by the other spouse, therefore
women may be better able to limit income hiding by men.
1.7 Discussion: Other Motivations, Strategies, and Implications
for Welfare
In this section, I discuss potential motivations for income hiding other than remittances,
strategies for income hiding other than purposeful misreporting, and the implications of
income hiding on welfare.
The impact of income hiding on overall household welfare depends on spousal preferences
and how hidden income is used and would have been used if it was not hidden. Without more
information and assumptions about preferences and the counter-factual, the overall impact
of income hiding on welfare cannot be determined. Even so, the results are still informative
to policy discussions on household welfare. Policymakers have focused on interventions that
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facilitate greater remittances and reduce information asymmetries based on the positive
impacts on a variety of measures of well being associated with each of these two outcomes
(Yang, 2011). However, my results show that these two outcomes may be inconsistent with
each other. The conceptual framework implies that if information asymmetry is reduced
through a reduction in income hiding by spouses, remittances would also decrease, and vice
versa. In such settings, the welfare impacts of information asymmetry reducing or remittance
increasing interventions are a priori ambiguous.
Based on the conceptual framework and empirical evidence strategic misreporting is
intended to influence remittance levels. However, misreporting may be intended to influence
other aspects of the remittance relationship. Spouses may hide income if migrants view their
participation in the labor force negatively. If based on the remittance contract, the spouse
staying back takes on household and childcare responsibilities, higher reported incomes may
signal to the migrant that spouses are not allocating enough time and effort to these tasks.
Similarly, migrants may hide income but not reduce remittances to signal their altruism in
sending a greater proportion of their income as remittances. Alternately, migrants may hide
income to avoid sharing it with other household members. If spouses share the remittances
they receive with other household or family members, migrants may hide income to avoid
such sharing.
While the experimental design identifies purposeful misreporting, this may be an under-
estimate of strategic reporting behavior defined more broadly. Misreporting information is
one of a range of actions that can be used to hide information from spouses. Instead of pur-
posefully misreporting information individuals may avoid discussing financial matters or give
incomplete information to their spouses. This passive misreporting, however, is no longer an
option for individuals in the treatment group as their reported information will be shared
with and observable to their spouses. They must either commit to hiding information and
purposefully misreport it or report the truth. If spousal observability induces these passive
misreporters to tell the truth, their prior misreporting will not be identified by the treatment
effect. This passive misreporting may also explain why despite biased beliefs about expenses,
I do not find evidence that migrants or spouses strategically misreport them.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper analyzes spousal communication in transnational households by eliciting the
causal effect of spousal observability on reported information to identify if spouses strate-
gically misreport information to each other. Research on information asymmetry between
migrants and their households has primarily focused on income hiding by migrants and its
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impact on remittances and the perceived returns to migration. This is the first study that
looks at strategic misreporting on both sides of the remittance relationship, across multiple
margins of the household’s actual finances.
I find that both migrants and spouses have biased beliefs about each other’s finances.
Spouses and certain subgroups of migrants strategically misreport information to each other.
Misreporting is greater when information is more difficult to observe and less likely to be
verified. The results are consistent with an income-sharing model where both spouses have
private information and income hiding is constrained by the threat of punishment.
These results are important for policy-makers considering interventions to reduce infor-
mation asymmetry among transnational households because they identify strategic misre-
porting as the cause of this asymmetry. Interventions that only increase communication
between spouses would not be able to address this strategic behavior. In focus groups con-
ducted before this study, almost all transnational couples reported communicating with each
other daily through instant messages or phone calls. However, the results show that biased
beliefs and the ability to strategically misreport information persist despite these significant
improvements in communication technology. Addressing purposeful misreporting requires
interventions that increase spouses’ abilities to monitor and control each other’s financial
decision-making, including interventions that specifically increase communication about fi-
nances.
I also find that strategic misreporting is limited to certain subgroups of transnational
households, implying that interventions to reduce strategic misreporting would be most
effective when targeted to these households. Importantly, these subgroups can be identified
from observable baseline characteristics of communication, monitoring, and control over
financial decision-making.
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Figure 1.1: Project Timeline
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Figure 1.2: Monthly Remittances Against Net Income
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Notes: The figure shows scatter plots and linear regression lines for the control group. Remittances are
measured in dirhams per month and were reported in the migrant baseline survey. Net income is reported
monthly income net of reported monthly expenses, measured in dirhams. Panel A shows the relationship of
remittances with migrant’s reported net income and panel B shows it for spouse’s reported net income.
28
Figure 1.3: Spouse’s Information Asymmetry at Baseline
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Notes: Vertical axis is dirhams per month in panel I and proportion of individuals reporting these migrant
non-wage benefits in panel II.
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Figure 1.4: Migrant’s Information Asymmetry at Baseline
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Figure 1.5: Cumulative Distribution of Reported Income
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Notes: Panels A and B plot the empirical cumulative distribution of the spouse’s and migrant’s reported
incomes, respectively.
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Table 1.1: Migrant Baseline Summary Statistics: Selection & Balance
Selection Balance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Invited Participating Diff Treat Control Diff
Sample Sample p-val p-val
Treatment 0.50 0.51 (0.82) 1.00 0.00
Spouse participated 0.61 0.54 0.64 (0.21)
Demographics
Male 0.69 0.62 (0.02) 0.63 0.60 (0.73)
Age 37.45 37.61 (0.74) 37.58 37.64 (0.96)
Children 1.95 2.09 (0.08) 2.02 2.17 (0.50)
Income range (AED/month)
Less than 1,500 0.05 0.08 (0.09) 0.06 0.09 (0.51)
1,500 - 3,000 0.33 0.30 (0.27) 0.30 0.29 (0.98)
3,000 - 4,500 0.26 0.29 (0.39) 0.31 0.27 (0.59)
4,500 - 6,000 0.10 0.09 (0.63) 0.12 0.06 (0.20)
6,000 - 7,500 0.05 0.04 (0.63) 0.02 0.06 (0.23)
7,500 - 9,000 0.03 0.04 (0.46) 0.04 0.05 (0.66)
9,000 - 10,000 0.02 0.01 (0.48) 0.00 0.03 (0.16)
Greater than 10,000 0.06 0.06 (0.99) 0.09 0.04 (0.21)
Occupation
Food & Personal Services 0.20 0.17 (0.22) 0.14 0.21 (0.25)
Sales 0.16 0.13 (0.15) 0.15 0.10 (0.39)
Construction & Maintenance 0.10 0.13 (0.15) 0.14 0.13 (0.89)
Administration 0.09 0.08 (0.38) 0.10 0.05 (0.26)
Communication and Control
Years in UAE 7.05 6.79 (0.44) 6.93 6.65 (0.73)
Years since last visit 1.81 2.05 1.56 (0.12)
Visits per year 0.74 0.69 0.78 (0.29)
Relatives in UAE 2.69 2.43 2.95 (0.36)
Spouse HH members 3.29 3.32 3.26 (0.83)
Spouse lives with In-laws 0.30 0.34 0.26 (0.33)
Discuss budget (times per month) 1.10 1.06 (0.81) 1.37 0.78 (0.12)
Want more control of spending 0.43 0.42 (0.82) 0.46 0.39 (0.17)
Instruct spouse on spending 0.52 0.55 (0.24) 0.58 0.53 (0.49)
Remittance Behavior
Spouse is main recipient 0.99 0.99 (0.50) 1.00 0.99 (0.32)
Other recipients 1.06 1.18 (0.18) 1.16 1.21 (0.84)
Remit monthly 0.90 0.91 (0.64) 0.93 0.89 (0.35)
Remittance (dirham/month) 1,555 1,449 (0.23) 1,330 1,517 (0.16)
N 492 159 81 78
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) show means for all invited migrants and those who participated in the study,
respectively. Column (3) shows the p-value from the two-sided t-test of equivalence of means between those
who participated and those who were invited but did not participate in the study. Columns (4) and (5) show
means within treatment and control groups, respectively. Column (6) shows the p-value from the two-sided
t-test of equivalence of means between the treatment and control group.
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Table 1.2: Information Asymmetry at Baseline
Migrant’s Spouse’s Difference
Report Report Mean p-val
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Migrant’s Information
Income 3809.29 3178.31 630.98 (0.12)
Expenses 1201.39 1384.88 -183.49 (0.24)
Net Income 2634.66 2136.65 498.01 (0.17)
Employment Benefits
Food 0.12 0.00 0.12 (0.00)∗∗∗
Housing 0.19 0.08 0.12 (0.03)∗∗
Transport 0.21 0.10 0.10 (0.07)∗
Health 0.77 0.58 0.19 (0.01)∗∗
Travel 0.65 0.62 0.03 (0.66)
Panel B: Spouse’s Information
Income 475.75 684.76 -209.01 (0.06)∗
Expense 1513.50 1237.82 275.68 (0.02)∗∗
Net Income -975.50 -532.78 -442.71 (0.01)∗∗
N 78 79
Notes: Column (1) shows the means of migrant’s reports of their own finances in panel A and the means
of their beliefs about their spouse’s finances in panel B. Column (2) shows the means of spouse’s reports
of their own finances in panel B and the means of their belief’s about their migrant’s finances in panel A.
Column (3) shows the difference between the mean reports and beliefs. Column (4) shows the p-value from
the two-sided t-test of equivalence of means between reports and beliefs. ***, **, * denote significance at




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Age 38.49 36.20 -2.29 (0.05)∗
Children 2.12 2.05 -0.07 (0.73)
Income range (AED/month)
Less than 1,500 0.05 0.11 0.06 (0.18)
1,500 - 3,000 0.23 0.39 0.16 (0.04)∗
3,000 - 4,500 0.31 0.26 -0.04 (0.55)
4,500 - 6,000 0.13 0.03 -0.10 (0.02)∗
6,000 - 7,500 0.03 0.07 0.03 (0.34)
7,500 - 9,000 0.04 0.05 0.01 (0.81)
9,000 - 10,000 0.01 0.02 0.01 (0.75)
Greater than 10,000 0.09 0.02 -0.08 (0.03)∗
Occupation
Services 0.16 0.18 0.02 (0.78)
Food Services 0.14 0.02 -0.13 (0.00)∗∗
Personal Services 0.02 0.16 0.14 (0.01)∗∗
Sales 0.11 0.15 0.04 (0.53)
Construction & Maintenance 0.18 0.05 -0.13 (0.01)∗∗
Administration 0.05 0.11 0.06 (0.18)
Monitoring and Control
Years in UAE 7.32 5.95 -1.37 (0.08)
Years since last visit 2.02 1.48 -0.54 (0.04)∗
Visits per year 0.73 0.74 0.00 (0.96)
Relatives in UAE 2.40 3.13 0.73 (0.24)
Spouse HH members 3.49 2.97 -0.52 (0.07)
Spouse lives with In-laws 0.27 0.34 0.07 (0.37)
Discuss budget per monthy 0.53 0.61 0.08 (0.31)
Want more control of spending 0.36 0.58 0.22 (0.01)∗∗
Instruct spouse on spending 0.50 0.70 0.20 (0.01)∗
Remittance Behavior
Spouse is main recipient 0.99 1.00 0.01 (0.32)
Other recipients 1.14 1.25 0.10 (0.64)
Remit monthly 0.91 0.91 -0.01 (0.91)
Remittance (AED/month) 1700.63 1173.48 -527.15 (0.00)∗∗
N 98 61
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) show means for male and female migrants who participated in the study,
respectively. Column (3) shows the difference of means between male and female migrant participants.
Column (4) shows the p-value from the two-sided t-test of equivalence of means of male and female migrant
participants. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels
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1.10 Appendix
1.10.1 Remittances and Income: Comparative Statics
I present an income-sharing model that adapts the exchange-based model from Rapoport
and Docquier (2006) and shows that remittances are increasing in the migrant’s income and
decreasing in the spouse’s income.
Consider two agents, the migrant (M) and their spouse (S). Each agent has their re-
spective pre-transfer income (y) and consumption (c). The migrant sends a remittance (r)
to their spouse while in return the spouse provides household or childcare services (h). Each
agent derives utility (Ui for i=M,S) from their own consumption with diminishing marginal
utility (u′i(ci) > 0 and u
′
i(ci) < 0). Each agent’s consumption increases in their income
(c′i(yi) > 0 for i=M,S). The migrant’s consumptions decreases, while the spouse’s con-
sumption increases with remittances (c′M(r) < 0 and c
′
S(r) > 0). The migrant also derives
increasing utility from the service provided by the spouse (u′M(h) > 0), whereas the spouse
experiences dis-utility of effort from providing the service (u′S(h) < 0).
Both the migrant and spouse must accept the terms of the income-sharing contract.
Suppose that to accept a contract the spouse requires a minimum compensating utility of
(ŪS). This utility level is based on the spouse’s expectations of the level consumption they
will enjoy and the level of household and childcare services they will have to be provide as
a result of the temporary migration of the other spouse (ŪS(c̄S, h̄)). If the migrant remits
the minimum amount such that the spouse will accept, the remittance amount must be such
that:
US(cS(yS, r), h) ≥ ŪS(c̄S, h̄)
Solving this acceptance constraint with equality, r may be expressed as r = r(yS). The




















The minimum amount of remittances that the spouse is willing to accept decreases with
the spouse’s income. If the spouse’s propensity to consume from income and remittances is
the same, i.e. remittances are completely fungible, this becomes a one-to-one relationship.
A similar acceptance constraint can de derived for the migrant for the maximum amount
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they are willing to remit to keep a minimum compensating utility (ŪM(c̄M , h̄)).
UM(cM(yM , r), h) ≥ ŪM(c̄M , h̄)




















As the migrant’s consumption decreases with remittances, the maximum amount of remit-
tances that the migrant is willing to send is increasing with the migrant’s income.
1.10.2 Subject pool recruitment protocol
The subject pool of migrants was recruited as part of De Arcangelis and Yang (2019).
The subject pool is comprised of migrant workers from the Philippines living and working
in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE). Migrants were recruited via face-to-face intercepts
in locations frequented by Filipino workers in Dubai. Participants had to answer yes to the
following screening questions to enroll in the subject pool:
1. Do you expect to continue working in Dubai for the next twelve months?
2. To participate, you will need to download a mobile application we developed called
”Padalapp” that allows OFWs (Overseas Filipino Workers) to record and keep track
of their remittances. Are you willing to download the smartphone app Padalapp using
our pocket wifi?
3. Are you willing to commit to participating for the whole 12-month study period starting
from today?
4. Do you agree to complete the weekly one-question surveys for the next 12 months?
5. Do you agree to receive phone calls, SMS, and FB messages from the research team
for the next 12 months? We will only contact you for the purpose of facilitating this
study.
6. Do you agree for us to invite your household in the Philippines (we will identify the
household respondent later in this interview) to also participate in this study?
Individuals answering yes to all the above questions were then asked to sign a consent form
to join the subject pool. Participants were administered a short face-to-face baseline survey
to collect baseline characteristics of participants and their households in the Philippines.
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To identify the relevant remittance-receiving household in the Philippines, participants
were asked to name (and provide contact information for) an individual in the Philippines
who would be the recipient of a US$500 lottery prize (implemented by the study among
subject pool participants). The participants choice identifies an individual (referred to as
the target beneficiary) and household (referred to as the target household) in the Philippines
whose well-being is important to the participant. Subject pool participants who identified
their spouses as either their target beneficiaries or as a member of their target household
were invited to participate in the spousal communication experiment.
An overlapping subset of the migrants in the subject pool also participated in the ran-
domized labeled remittances intervention in De Arcangelis and Yang (2019). In my analysis,
I control for the migrants’ participation and treatment status, conditional on participation,
in this intervention.
1.10.3 Experiment Protocol: Scripts
Introduction SMS - Prior to being called for the survey, participants were sent the fol-
lowing text message from a number identified as IPA (Innovations for Poverty Action):
Hello PARTICIPANT NAME, I am SURVEYOR NAME, a surveyor from Innovations
for Poverty Action. You have been participating in our study about OFWs remittance
behaviour in UAE. We would like to invite you to participate in a new survey about the
migration experience of OFWs in UAE and their households in the Philippines. The survey
will take about 30 min of your time. By participating you will help inform fellow Filipinos
about the migration experience and also learn from their experience. Would you be available
at DAY and TIME? If so I would call you then and tell you more details about it.
Introduction Call - Surveyors introduced the study using the following script as part of
the consent process:
I would like to invite you to participate in a research study on the migration experience of
OFWs in UAE and their households in the Philippines. The purpose of this study is to learn
about the experience of OFWs and how we can better inform OFWs and their households
about the costs and benefits of living and working in the UAE. By taking part in this study
you will learn about these important issues and will also be helping inform fellow Filipinos
about them.
If you choose to participate, you will be asked to complete a survey that covers your
demographic and financial information. This survey will take approximately 15 minutes of
your time. We will also call your spouse and invite them to participate in this study. At
the end of the study, we will share our results with you and your spouse, which will include
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information about the average income, expenditures of OFWs in the UAE and their spouses
in the Philippines.
Treatment Status - The treatment status was revealed during the survey using the
following scripts when the surveyor reached the experimental survey section:
Control Group: Now I would like to ask some questions about your experience in the
UAE. As I mentioned, we will be sharing with you and your spouse the summary results
from this section. Keep in mind that your individual responses will NOT be shared with
your spouse or anyone else. This is a separate activity with each spouse and because of the
rules of this activity, we will not share your individual responses to the following questions
with your spouse. Your individual responses will be kept private.
Treatment Group: Now I would like to ask some questions about your experience in the
UAE. As I mentioned, we will be sharing with you and your spouse the summary results
from this section. Keep in mind that your individual responses WILL also be shared with
your spouse. This is a joint activity with your spouse and because of the rules of this activity,
we will share your individual responses to the following questions with your spouse. Your
individual responses will not be private.
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Table 1.11: Migrant Baseline Summary Statistics of Participating Spouses: Selection &
Balance
Selection Balance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Invited Participating Diff Treat Control Diff
Sample Sample p-val p-val
Treatment 0.50 0.49 (0.73) 1.00 0.00
Spouse participated 0.61 0.58 0.63 (0.50)
Demographics
Male 0.69 0.65 (0.23) 0.67 0.63 (0.62)
Age 37.45 37.79 (0.49) 37.61 37.96 (0.76)
Children 1.95 1.95 (0.99) 1.88 2.01 (0.47)
Income range (AED/month)
Less than 1,500 0.05 0.06 (0.54) 0.08 0.04 (0.28)
1,500 - 3,000 0.33 0.31 (0.53) 0.28 0.34 (0.38)
3,000 - 4,500 0.26 0.31 (0.13) 0.32 0.30 (0.87)
4,500 - 6,000 0.10 0.09 (0.50) 0.14 0.04 (0.02)∗
6,000 - 7,500 0.05 0.05 (0.69) 0.01 0.08 (0.06)
7,500 - 9,000 0.03 0.05 (0.42) 0.03 0.06 (0.27)
9,000 - 10,000 0.02 0.02 (0.91) 0.01 0.03 (0.58)
Greater than 10,000 0.06 0.06 (0.93) 0.07 0.06 (0.95)
Occupation
Food & Personal Services 0.20 0.17 (0.19) 0.20 0.14 (0.34)
Sales 0.16 0.14 (0.49) 0.09 0.19 (0.08)
Construction & Maintenance 0.10 0.13 (0.20) 0.12 0.14 (0.70)
Administration 0.09 0.10 (0.55) 0.14 0.06 (0.10)
Communication and Control
Years in UAE 7.05 6.66 (0.24) 6.37 6.94 (0.45)
Years since last visit 1.70 1.98 1.46 (0.19)
Visits per year 0.68 0.59 0.76 (0.10)
Relatives in UAE 2.53 2.14 2.88 (0.28)
Spouse HH members 3.28 3.32 3.24 (0.82)
Spouse lives with In-laws 0.32 0.33 0.31 (0.83)
Discuss budget per month 1.10 1.05 (0.78) 1.26 0.85 (0.32)
Want more control of spending 0.43 0.43 (0.93) 0.45 0.41 (0.60)
Instruct spouse on spending 0.52 0.55 (0.32) 0.55 0.54 (0.92)
Remittance Behavior
Spouse is main recipient 0.99 0.99 (0.71) 1.00 0.97 (0.16)
Other recipients 1.06 1.12 (0.51) 0.89 1.34 (0.04)∗
Remit monthly 0.90 0.89 (0.55) 0.93 0.86 (0.15)
Remittance (dirham/month) 1,555 1,513 (0.65) 1,421 1,601 (0.36)
N 492 155 76 79
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) show means for the migrants of all invited spouses and those spouses who
participated in the study, respectively. Column (3) shows the p-value from the two-sided t-test of equivalence
of means between those who participated and those who were invited but did not participate in the study.
Columns (4) and (5) show means within treatment and control groups, respectively. Column (6) shows the














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































How Do Taxpayers Respond to Public Disclosure and
Social Recognition Programs? Evidence from Pakistan
From a work with Joel Slemrod and Mazhar Waseem
Abstract
We examine two Pakistani programs to see if the public disclosure of tax information and
social recognition of top taxpayers promote tax compliance. Pakistan began revealing income
tax paid by all taxpayers from 2012. Simultaneously, another program began recognizing
and rewarding the top 100 tax paying corporations, partnerships, self-employed individuals,
and wage-earners. We find that the public disclosure caused a 9 log-points and the social
recognition program a 17 log-points increase in the tax payments of agents exposed to the
program. Our results suggest that such programs can be important policy levers to mobilize
additional resources.
JEL Classification: H24, H25, H26
Keywords: Tax evasion, income tax, social norms
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2.1 Introduction
Tax evasion is a pervasive problem in developing countries and a non-trivial one in de-
veloped countries (Slemrod, 2019). Economic theory suggests that tax evasion is deterred
by the risk of detection and punishment (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972), and it may be in-
fluenced by social and psychological factors, such as guilt or shame from evading, pride from
fulfilling one’s civic duty, and approval or sanctions from peers (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014).
To leverage these motivations, many countries employ policies that disclose tax information,
shame tax delinquents, or honor top tax payers. Given that these policies entail little resource
costs, they are becoming increasingly common.1 Yet, there is little evidence, especially from
the emerging economies, on how effective they are in promoting tax compliance.
In this paper, we exploit two Pakistani programs to fill this gap in literature. In the first
of these programs, the government began revealing the amount of income tax paid by every
taxpayer in the country. The public disclosure program was instigated by a series of press
reports documenting that the majority of lawmakers of the country had not been fulfilling
their tax obligations. It began in the tax year 2012 and has continued since then. Each
year, two tax directories are published, one for the Members of Parliament (MPs) and one
for all taxpayers. The directories are available online in a searchable PDF format and can
be downloaded freely by anyone. The directory for general taxpayers reveals the name, a
numerical tax identifier, and the tax paid by each taxpayer. The directory for MPs also lists
the constituency they serve.
The second program we examine publicly recognizes and rewards top taxpayers of the
country. The Taxpayers Privileges and Honour Card (TPHC) program began concurrently
with the public disclosure program. It acknowledges the top 100 taxpayers in each of four
categories—self-employed individuals, wage-earners, partnerships, and corporations—and
grants them certain privileges, such as invitation to a special ceremony hosted by the Prime
Minister and eligibility for benefits such as fast-track immigration and gratis passports.These
programs can influence tax compliance through a number of channels. Public disclosure can
encourage whistle-blowing, evoke shame and guilt, and inspire pride.2 Social recognition of
top taxpayers can stimulate a sense of pride and self-fulfillment. Some individuals may ob-
tain higher utility from the public appreciation of their affluence (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000;
1Dwenger and Treber (2018), for example, report that one-half of the OECD countries have the legal
power to publish the names of tax delinquents and nearly 90% of them used this power in 2015. Similarly, 23
US states run shaming programs, maintaining online lists of tax delinquents with their names and addresses
(Perez-Truglia and Troiano, 2018).
2Public disclosure may evoke shame and guilt if a taxpayer perceives her tax payments too low relative
to the consumption or wealth observed by peers. Similarly, it may inspire pride if one is revealed to be a
compliant or top taxpayer.
49
Glazer and Konrad, 1996), while others may monetize the goodwill offered by the programs,
translating the social recognition into higher sales and profits. Through these channels, the
two programs promote tax compliance. On the other hand, these programs could conceivably
backfire, if for example they reveal others to be even less compliant (Schultz et al., 2007) or
if they crowd out intrinsic motivation (Benabou and Tirole, 2003).
We use a novel empirical strategy to estimate the impacts of the public disclosure. As
noted above, the tax directory published under the program lists the name and a numerical
identifier of each taxpayer. The numeric identifier is effectively private information, known
primarily to the agent and the tax administration. Thus, the only publicly-disclosed infor-
mation that can link an observation in the directory to a particular taxpayer is the name.
Pakistani names do not follow the standard Western syntax of given name + middle name +
surname. Instead, a typical Pakistani name is composed of two or more given names. One
of these given names—usually the most-called name of the father or husband—serves as the
surname. Surnames in this way are usually not fixed across generations and vary even within
the nuclear family. Because of these naming conventions, it is quite common for people to
have the same full name. For example, the most frequent name in our data, Muhammad
Aslam, appears 15,598 times in four years, with a typical year’s directory containing more
than 60 pages listing the name Muhammad Aslam alone. On the other hand, about one-
third of taxpayers have unique names. This variation in name commonness implies that
the intensity of the disclosure varies considerably across individuals depending upon how
common their name is. Taxpayers with very frequent names enjoy virtual anonymity in the
disclosed records; uniquely-named taxpayers, on the other hand, are exposed perfectly. We
exploit this variation in treatment intensity in our empirical strategy, comparing the change
in tax payments across taxpayers with frequent and unique names
Of course, names are not randomly assigned. Instead, they are chosen by parents and
hence may be correlated with parental traits such as income, education, and ethnicity. We
always include individual fixed effects in our empirical models, implying that parental traits
will influence our estimates only if their effects change over time, in particular contempora-
neously with the program. We provide two sets of tests to rule out this and related concerns.
First, we show through both visual and regression-based evidence that the tax payments of
the compared groups were trending similarly in the six pre-program periods: the relative dif-
ference in the outcome was indistinguishable from zero for virtually all these years. Second,
we show that the name of a taxpayer bears no association with the outcome in the sample
of taxpayers (MPs) where the disclosure intensity is independent of the name commonness.
The TPHC program applies only to the top 100 taxpayers of each category. We leverage
this discontinuity in program eligibility to estimate its impacts. If social recognition and
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related benefits offered by the program are valued, taxpayers close to the eligibility cutoff
will increase their tax payments in order to remain in, or enter into, the top 100 club. We
test this by comparing the yearly growth in tax liability reported by agents close to the cutoff
with other top taxpayers. To show that our estimates are not driven by factors unrelated to
the program such as rising inequality at the top, we run placebo regressions estimating the
program effects in pre-intervention periods and on unaffected groups.
We combine the disclosed data of the years 2012-2015 with administrative tax return
data from 2006-2012 to create a long panel of tax records from 2006 to 2015. Our popula-
tions of interest are the universe of self-employed tax filers for the public disclosure program
and the top-1000 taxpayers of each category for the TPHC program. We document three
key findings. First, the exposure of tax information induced a substantial response from
the treated taxpayers. The tax liability reported by taxpayers with less common names on
average increased by around 9 log points as a result of the program. Consistent with our
expectations, the estimated effect varies directly with the program intensity. It is strongest
in the left-tail of the name-frequency distribution, declines monotonically as we move right-
ward, and becomes insignificant as the name-frequency approaches 300 (i.e., the name of
the taxpayer appears at least 300 times in the four years of disclosed data). Along the
extensive margin, the program caused a 1-2 log points increase in tax filing by individuals
with less common names relative to others. Second, the TPHC program also had a large
impact. The tax liability reported by 70-130 ranked taxpayers grew by nearly 17 log points
faster than others as a result of the program. This estimate declines slightly as we widen the
treatment window, suggesting that, as hypothesized, the effect is concentrated around the
eligibility cutoff of the program. Finally, we document that our estimates are highly robust
to alternative specifications and identification concerns noted above.
Our empirical strategy implicitly assumes that the public disclosure did not affect the
tax payments of more-common-named taxpayers. However, we have noted above that such
programs can backfire and decrease compliance; for example if they cause a perception that
others are even less compliant. To rule out such a possibility in our setting, we compare
the tax payments of wage-earners and self-employed taxpayers in a difference-in-differences
research design. Under the assumption that the public disclosure had no effect on wage-
earners given that their earnings are third-party-reported, we estimate the average effect
of the program on the more-common-named self-employed, finding it to be positive. This
implies that the public disclosure had an overall positive effect on the self-employed and a
much stronger effect on the less-common-named individuals amongst these, for whom the
exposure to the program was more intense. To this extent, our estimates reported above
provide a lower bound on the true effect of the program.
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As we note above, programs similar to the ones we study are becoming increasingly
common. Public disclosure of taxes with varying degrees of coverage and access is now in
place in a diverse group of countries including Norway, Finland, Sweden, Iceland, Australia,
Japan, and Pakistan. Of these, Norway’s program is closest to the Pakistan’s. Exploiting a
unique feature of the Norwegian program, Bø, Slemrod and Thoresen (2015) estimate that it
caused at least 3 percent increase in income reported by the self-employed. Unsurprisingly,
the effect we find is stronger given that the baseline noncompliance in our setting is expected
to be larger (see Hasegawa et al., 2012 and Hoopes, Robinson and Slemrod, 2018 for analyses
of the Japanese and Australian programs).
Shaming programs, which although not identical to the programs we study, rely on similar
behavioral factors are even more common. For example, as we note above some version of
the shaming program was in use in one-half of the OECD countries in 2015. Dwenger
and Treber (2018) study one such program from Slovenia finding that taxpayers reduce
their debt by 8.5% to avoid shaming, particularly in sectors where reputational concerns
are more important. Similarly, 23 US states implement some type of shaming program
via maintaining online lists of tax delinquents with their names and addresses. Using a
randomized intervention, Perez-Truglia and Troiano (2018) find that increasing the visibility
of tax delinquency status increases compliance by individuals, a result qualitatively very
similar to ours. Most of the above programs and the related studies have developed-country
settings. In developing countries, tax enforcement capacity is limited and evasion is pervasive.
In such settings, the programs we study have a particular appeal, offering potentially cost-
effective options to mobilize resources. Of course, any such policy needs to balance the
revenue gains against concerns such as privacy and security.3 Our estimates provide a basis
for such an evaluation.
Our paper is also related to another strand of literature that studies social motivations
in tax compliance, mostly through lab and field experiments (see Mascagni, 2018 for a
survey). Del Carpio (2013), for example, randomizes deterrence messages to study the role
of social norms in property tax compliance in Peru. Castro and Scartascini (2015) run a
similar experiment in Argentina and Kettle et al. (2016) in Guatemala (please see Slemrod,
Blumenthal and Christian, 2001, Fellner, Sausgruber and Traxler, 2013, and Dwenger et al.,
2016 for three similar studies from developed countries). Relative to these studies, we provide
evidence on the impacts of two national programs that appeal, among other things, to social
motivations of taxpayers.
The Pakistani public tax disclosure program has been studied in one recent political
3Please see Lenter, Slemrod and Shackelford (2003); Blank (2014); Perez-Truglia (2020) for the non-tax
effects of public disclosure.
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science paper. Malik (2019) investigates the impact of the program on the tax reporting
behavior of MPs. She uses two years’ publicly available data to assess if MPs in more
competitive races respond more aggressively to the program than others and similar political
economy questions. As we note above, the primary focus of our paper is the universe of tax
filers and not MPs.
2.2 Context
In this section, we describe features of the Pakistani environment that are important for
our empirical analysis.
2.2.1 The Public Disclosure Program
In the first of two programs we study, the Pakistani government started publishing a tax
directory each year, revealing income tax paid by every taxpayer in the country.4 The policy
change (in large part) was instigated by a string of investigative reports that began appearing
in the Pakistani press in the latter half of 2012. The reports focused primarily on the tax
affairs of lawmakers of the country, documenting that a majority of them had apparently
not been fulfilling their tax obligations. Combining data leaked by whistle-blowers with the
official data obtained through the Election Commission of Pakistan, the reports painted quite
a bleak picture of tax compliance among the MPs of the country. It was reported that around
66% of them—including 34 out of 55 federal ministers—had not filed their tax return for the
latest year; in fact, about 20% of them had not even obtained the National Tax Number,
which is the first requirement for tax filing (Center for Investigative Reporting in Pakistan,
2012). These revelations, compiled into two papers published by the Center of Investigative
Reporting in Pakistan (CIRP), generated strong reaction. The Federal Tax Ombudsman,
upon a representation filed by a citizen, ordered the government to begin disclosing the tax
remitted by every public office holder in the country. The leading opposition party at the
time went even further, pledging to publish the amount of tax remitted by all taxpayers in
the country if elected to power. This party won the next elections and formed the federal
government in May 2013. It fulfilled its election promise and began publishing the tax
records for the tax year 2012 onward, which were due to be filed by December 15, 2013.5
4Tax paid here refers to the self-assessed tax liability reported by a taxpayer in their annual income tax
return, which includes any tax withheld at source. The Pakistani tax code requires that this self-assessed
tax liability should be deposited into the treasury at the time of filing of return. For this reason, we use the
terms tax paid and tax liability interchangeably in this paper.
5The Pakistani tax year runs from July to June. Any year t in this paper denotes the tax year from July
t to June t+ 1.
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Since the institution of the program in 2012, two tax directories are published each year,
one for MPs and the other for all taxpayers. These directories are posted online on the
Federal Board of Revenue (FBR)’s website in a searchable PDF format.6 They can also
be downloaded freely by anyone. The directory for general taxpayers reveals the name, tax
identifier, and tax liability of each taxpayer. This information—sorted alphabetically on the
full name—is provided separately for corporations, partnerships, and individuals. The tax
identifier is either the nine-digit National Tax Number (NTN), disclosed with the tax year
2012 data, or the 13-digit Computerized National Identity Card Number (CNIC), disclosed
with the 2013 tax year data and thereafter, both of which are effectively private information
of agents.7 Therefore, the only information through which an observation in the directory can
be readily linked to a taxpayer is the name.8 In contrast, the directory of parliamentarians
also contains the constituency number an MP serves, and therefore the disclosed information
can be linked to them fairly easily.
Table A.I lists important events in the public disclosure program. The timing of these
events is important for our empirical analysis, in particular in deciding from which period the
program would begin affecting behavior. As we note above, the political party committed
to the full public disclosure had come into power in May 2013. The last date for filing the
2012 tax return was December 15, 2013.9 Thus, by the time the 2012 returns were filed, it
was clear that the tax remitted through them would be made public. We accordingly treat
tax year 2012 (which covers July 2012 - June 2013) as the first post-program year in our
analysis. Although the exact format of the disclosure was not known at the time, it was clear
that it would, at a minimum, include the name of the taxpayer. The name is a primary, and
to some extent the only, information through which the public can link a tax return to a
6In fact, the title page of the directory contains the following direction in a very salient yellow box:
“Please press CTRL + F Key to Search the Record”.
7The NTN is used exclusively for tax filing. It was issued sequentially beginning in 1995, so the number
reveals some information about how long a taxpayer has been in the tax net. The CNIC is the primary
identification and proof of citizenship document in Pakistan. It is required for most official services including
obtaining a passport, driving license, utility connection, opening and operating bank accounts. The first few
digits of the CNIC indicate the district (of 128 in Pakistan) where the individual resided at the time of initial
registration.
8FBR provides an online taxpayer verification service through which tax identifiers can be used to obtain
additional taxpayer information, namely address (at the time of registration), registration date and regional
tax office. This additional information may improve the chances of linking an observation in the directory to
a taxpayer but may still not be sufficient. A taxpayer’s address may have changed since they first registered
for an NTN or it may not be public information. Additionally, there is a significant effort cost of obtaining
the information and it is increasing in the commonness of the taxpayer’s name. The tax identifiers of all
taxpayers with a particular name would have to be manually entered one at a time to obtain the additional
information and online security features prevent the process from being automated. The effective disclosure
intensity therefore is still linked primarily to the commonness of the taxpayer’s name.
9Generally, a majority of tax returns are filed in the last few weeks before the due date. Consistent with
this trend, more than 90% of the 2012 returns in our data were filed in or after October 2013.
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taxpayer, and therefore there could be no meaningful disclosure without it.10
As we note above, the MPs’ directory also contains the constituency number they serve.
Table A.II reports the composition of the Pakistani legislature. Because the country has
a limited number of MPs, their identities are well known, especially in their electoral con-
stituencies. Their exposure to the program therefore must be independent of how common
their name is. We use this feature of the program as a specification check on our empirical
strategy.
Both sets of directories receive wide coverage in the Pakistani media, especially at the
time they are released. Figure A.I plots the time line of Google searches in Pakistan for
the phrases “FBR Tax Directory” and “Tax Directory”. Clearly, searches for these phrases
peak at the time the tax directories are published. In addition, simple Google searches of
“FBR Tax Directory” and “Tax Directory” looking for the occurrence of these words as exact
phrases return 1,010 and 32,800 results.11 This indicates that there are at least 1,010 (and
potentially many more)12 active web pages that discuss the Pakistani tax directories. This
profusion of information creates a strong first stage in our setting in the sense that many
Pakistani taxpayers are aware that their disclosed tax data would remain available online
for the foreseeable future and could be accessed anytime by their peer networks. Note that
the income tax exemption threshold in Pakistan, like other developing countries, is quite
high, set at around the 80th percentile of the income distribution (Waseem, 2020). Income
taxpayers in the country are a richer segment of the population and therefore they and their
peer networks are extremely likely to be exposed to the disclosed information, be it online
or in other formats.
2.2.2 The Taxpayer Privileges and Honour Card Program
The second program we examine is the Taxpayer Privileges and Honour Card (TPHC)
scheme. The program was announced at the beginning of the tax year 2012, in July 2012. It
acknowledges and grants special privileges to the top 100 taxpayers in each of the following
four categories: (a) wage-earners, (b) self-employed individuals, (c) partnerships, and (d)
corporations. The special privileges granted by the program include: (1) automatic invitation
to the Annual Excellence Awards hosted by the Prime Minister; (2) automatic invitation to
the state dinners held on Pakistan Day (23rd March) and Independence Day (14th August);
10The CIRP reports that precipitated the full public disclosure program always used the name as the
primary identifier of a taxpayer.
11This data was accessed on May 28, 2019 in Manchester, UK.
12Similar Google searches looking for the occurrence of “FBR Tax Directory” and “Tax Directory” not
as exact phrases return 169,000 and 867,000,000 results, suggesting that there are potentially many more
active web pages that discuss the two sets of directories.
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(3) fast-track immigration through special counters (Figure A.II provides a photograph of
such an immigration counter at the Lahore airport); (4) issuance of gratis passports; (5)
access to VIP lounges at Pakistani airports; and (6) an increased baggage allowance. These
privileges last one complete year, until the new set of recipients are announced. The personal
benefits of the program are conferred on the partner with the highest capital contribution
in the case of partnerships, and on the CEO in the case of corporations.
Two features of the program need emphasizing. First, while the principal element of the
program is the social recognition of top taxpayers,13 it provides some material benefits as
well. To the extent that these benefits are valued, the response to the program would also
reflect the willingness to pay of top taxpayers for these benefits. Second, the program has
some overlap with the public disclosure, as the latter also identifies top taxpayers, albeit
indirectly. In fact, most of the news items that report on the public disclosure program also
focus on who are the top taxpayers in the disclosed data. This media recognition, however,
is indirect, usually limited to the very top taxpayers (say top 10), and is not as salient or
meaningful as one offered by the TPHC program. But to the extent that the two programs
overlap, our estimates will capture the combined effects of the two.
2.2.3 Pakistani Naming Conventions
Pakistani names generally do not conform to the standard Western syntax of given name
+ middle name + surname. Instead, a typical Pakistani name consists of one or more given
names and a surname. The given names are usually derived from Persian, Arabic, or Turkish,
and it is quite common for people to have more than one given name. If a person has two
or more given names, the less common one serves as the most-called name (the person is
informally referred to by this given name). For example, if Muhammad is one of the multiple
given names, it is usually not the person’s most-called name, as being so common it does not
serve as a useful identifier. Unlike the Western practice, surnames in Pakistan are usually
not fixed across generations. The most popular convention is to adopt the most-called given
name of father (husband) as the child’s (married woman’s) surname. As a result, surnames
vary even within the nuclear family (father/husband has a different surname). In cases where
the surname does not vary within the family, it is rarely unique. For example, virtually all
people of Pashtun origin use Khan as their surname.
Because of these conventions, many full names are widely shared in Pakistan. Figure
2.1 illustrates this formally. We plot the distribution of full names contained in the public
disclosure data for the tax years 2012-2015. To construct the diagram, we treat all En-
13Addressing the first batch of the Honour Card recipients, the Prime Minister said that the “ceremony
has been convened to acknowledge your services for the nation.”
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glish variants of an Urdu name as one. For example, Muhammad spelled as Mohammad,
Muhammed or Mohammed is treated as one name (to an Urdu speaker, they would be indis-
tinguishable). To show that adjusting these spelling variations does not change our results
materially, we provide the corresponding raw distributions in Figure A.III (the details of our
cleaning algorithm are presented in Appendix A.1). A total of 526,425 unique names appear
in the publicly disclosed data during the four years. Of these, Muhammad Aslam is the
most frequent, appearing 15,598 times. Because a single page of the directory on average
consists of 60 rows, a given year’s directory contains about 65 (15,598/(4*60)) pages listing
the name Muhammad Aslam alone. There are other such very frequent names. In fact,
nearly one-third of taxpayers share their full name with at least 500 others. The distribution
has a thick tail at the other end as well. Approximately 35% of taxpayers have names that
appear fewer than ten times in the four years of data; about 4% appear only once, while
24% of names appear between 2-5 times.
As we note above, the directory carries no publicly-known identifier other than the name.
The wide variation in name frequency thus translates into a wide variation in the effective
intensity of disclosure. Note that we do not expect, and do not assume, that taxpayers know
precisely how common their name is. However, persons with very frequent names such as
Muhammad Aslam would very likely have come across numerous other people of the same
name in their lives and would have—through a conscious or subconscious process—formed a
belief that their name grants virtual anonymity to them. On the other hand, unique-named
individuals would likely have a sense that any information with their name on it can be linked
to them directly. Once the public disclosure lists became available, it was straightforward
to acquire more concrete information about how common one’s name is.
2.3 Conceptual Framework
2.3.1 Social and Psychological Motivations in Tax Compliance
Economists have traditionally modeled tax evasion as if it were a choice under uncertainty
(Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). Successful evasion provides additional disposable income,
but evasion also entails the risk that the evaded amount will be recovered along with penalty
in case of detection. Assume a taxpayer earns real income z but reports z ≤ z with e ≡ z−z,
paying a tax T ≡ τ(z − e). The taxpayer perceives that evasion will be detected with
probability p, triggering a proportional penalty of θ applied to the evaded income upon




(1− p) .u [(1− τ)z + τe] + p.u [(1− τ)z − θe] . (2.1)
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In this model evasion is deterred solely by the fear of penalty. A risk-averse taxpayer balances
the disutility of income loss in the detected and penalized state against the utility of extra







where cA and cNA denote consumption in the detected and undetected states.
The deterrence model captures the first-order pattern of tax evasion quite well. For
example, cross-matching of third-party information reports means that the detection prob-
ability faced by taxpayers (such as wage-earners) on income covered by third-party reports
can be close to one even if only a small percentage of tax returns are actually audited (Slem-
rod, 2007; Kleven et al., 2011). Consistent with the model, the noncompliance rate of wage
income is considerably lower than that of self-employment income. For example, in the
United States the noncompliance rate of wage income is estimated to be 1%, whereas that
of self-employment income is around 63%. The deterrence model does not, though, explain
all aspects of tax evasion, and does not take into account social and psychological factors.14
These factors can be divided into three classes. First, there are factors that reduce utility
in both states of the world. Guilt, for example, may cause psychological and emotional
distress to a tax cheat even if the act of cheating remains undetected. Second are factors
such as shame that reduce utility only if cheating gets detected (Erard and Feinstein, 1994).
And, third, there are behavioral biases whereby the detection probability and penalty are
systematically mis-estimated by taxpayers (Scholz and Pinney, 1995; Chetty, 2009).
The public disclosure program we examine potentially affects each of these factors. By
facilitating whistle-blowing, it arguably raises both the real and perceived likelihood of de-
tection. It may also intensify the guilt and shame felt by tax cheats, especially if reported
income does not match consumption or wealth observed by peers. For these reasons, we
expect the public disclosure to reduce evasion and increase tax payments. There is, however,
some evidence, especially in the psychology literature, that the provision of information can
sometimes backfire (see for example Schultz et al., 2007). In our context, this suggests that
some individuals may start paying less taxes after the public disclosure if they perceive that
others are paying even less. We investigate, and rule out, such a boomerang effect in our
setting in section 2.4.1.
The TPHC program promotes compliance to the extent that social recognition of top
taxpayers can induce pride and a sense of accomplishment. Individuals may also treat
14For example, in an influential survey of the tax compliance literature, Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein
(1998) write that “factors such as a moral obligation to be truthful, or the social consequences of being a
known cheater, may add further enforcement incentives that are not accounted for in our models.”
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taxation as a position (Veblen) good, deriving utility from being seen as one of the richest
in the country (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000).15 The goodwill offered by the TPHC program
can perhaps in some cases be monetized, as well. Individuals and firms may advertise their
status as a top taxpayer to gain more consumers and sales. Due to these mechanisms, the
costs of evasion jump up at the eligibility cutoff of the program. The resulting notch will
induce taxpayers to locate on the eligible side of the cutoff, increasing the tax paid by agents
close to the cutoff. Working in the opposite direction, some taxpayers may place negative
value on the attention the program provides.
2.3.2 Empirical Strategy
We use difference-in-differences research designs to estimate the effects of the two pro-
grams on tax compliance. These designs are explained in greater detail below.
2.3.2.1 Public Disclosure Program
The public disclosure program was rolled out nationally, all at once. Therefore, the
principal identification challenge in estimating its effects is to control for any trends or
shocks that might affect tax reporting at the aggregate level and may coincide with the
program. We achieve this by exploiting the variation in exposure to the program caused by
the degree of uniqueness of a taxpayer’s name. We define Name Frequency as the number
of times a full name appears in the four years of the disclosed data. For example, the Name
Frequency of the most frequent name in the data—Muhammad Aslam—is 15,598. Taking
advantage of the observable differences in program intensity across taxpayers with different
Name Frequency, we estimate regressions of the form
log TaxPaidit = αi + β treati × aftert + λt + uit, (2.3)
where αi and λt are individual and year fixed effects, aftert is a dummy indicating 2012 or a
later year, and treati is an indicator of the Name Frequency of individual i. We experiment
with different Name Frequency cutoffs in our empirical specifications. The difference-in-
differences (DD) coefficient of interest β captures the differential effect of the program,
denoting the average additional tax paid in the post-program years by individuals with
relatively low Name Frequency. In this and all subsequent specifications, we cluster standard
errors at the individual level, the most aggregate level feasible in our setting (Abadie et al.,
2017; Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004).
15It has been found that consuming goods associated with wealth provides utility to some individuals even
if their consumption remains invisible to others (Bursztyn et al., 2018).
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For β to have a causal interpretation, it must be shown that the interaction variable and
the error terms are uncorrelated. Our treatment variable captures how unique a taxpayer’s
name is. But names are not randomly assigned. Instead, they are chosen by parents, perhaps
with the help of close relatives and friends. Any measure of name uniqueness, therefore, could
be correlated with parental traits such as income, education, and ethnicity. To control for
such correlations, we always include individual fixed effects in our regressions. The parental
traits, therefore, would influence our estimates only if their effect changes over time, in
particular in 2012.
We offer three pieces of evidence to rule out this concern. First, exploiting the panel
nature of data we show that there were no systematic differences between the compared
groups in terms of their tax payments in the pre-program years. We show this through the
following event-study regressions
log TaxPaidit = αi +
2015∑
j=2007
γj treati × 1.(year=j)t + λt + uit. (2.4)
The coefficients γjs here capture the average difference in tax payment between the two
groups in year j relative to the reference year 2006. For a variety of definitions of treatment,
we show that the estimated γjs remain trivial/insignificant in the pre-program years but be-
come large and significant in the post-program years. While validating our empirical strategy,
these results do not expressly rule out a contemporaneous macro event that affects the tax
payments of more-uniquely-named individuals. Note that in most difference-in-differences
setups this assumption remains untested and is presumed satisfied if the preexisting trends
are parallel. But in our setting we can go one step further than the parallel-trends assumption
to rule out this possibility more directly. As we note above, MPs in Pakistan are prominent
in their communities and their constituencies are listed in the directory. The effectiveness of
the disclosure is therefore plausibly independent of how conspicuous or obscure their name
is. We show that β remains statistically indistinguishable from zero when equation (2.3) is
estimated on the sample of MPs only. This result is consistent with our assertion that the
estimated coefficient of interest is driven by the causal impact of disclosure, rather than by
any residual correlation between the name and tax payment. In our final test, we estimate
equation (2.3) on the pre-program periods only (2006-2011), pretending as if the program
occurred in 2010 rather than the actual date of 2012. These placebo regressions always
return trivial/statistically insignificant coefficients on the interaction term of interest.
Our primary population of interest are the self-employed individuals. The Pakistani
tax code and our administrative data defines a taxpayer as self-employed if their salary
income does not exceed 50% of their taxable income. Self-employment income, being self-
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reported and not subject to substantial cross-checking with third-party information reports,
is the most amenable to manipulation. Tax compliance studies from around the globe show
that the incidence and extent of noncompliance is the highest for the self-employed (see for
example Slemrod, 2019 and Waseem, 2020). If the public disclosure program curtails tax
evasion, the effect would be the strongest for this section of the population.
2.3.2.2 TPHC Program
The TPHC program recognizes and rewards the top 100 taxpaying corporations, partner-
ships, self-employed individuals, and wage-earners. If the incentives and recognition offered
by the program are valued, taxpayers ranked just below 100 would attempt to get into the
top 100 in the next year and taxpayers just above the cutoff would attempt to stay there.
The discontinuous treatment would thus cause a spike in the growth of tax paid from year t
to t + 1 by taxpayers ranked around the eligibility cutoff of the program in year t. We test
this hypothesis by estimating regressions of the following sort:
∆log TaxPaidit = α + β treati × aftert + λt + uit, (2.5)
where λt are the year fixed effects and treati is a dummy indicating that taxpayer i was ranked
in a window around the cutoff in year t. We begin with a narrow window around the cutoff
and gradually widen it to determine whether, as expected, the effects of the program are
concentrated close to the cutoff. The TPHC program was announced before the beginning
of the tax year 2012. To respond to the program, however, the taxpayers needed to know
their rank. We assume this was not possible before the publication of the first set of public
disclosure data. For this reason, we consider 2013 as the first post-program year. We estimate
equation (2.5) on a sample of the top 1000 taxpayers in each of the four categories. The
principal identification concern in this setting is that income, and therefore tax liability,
of top taxpayers may be trending differently than others for non-program reasons such as
rising inequality. We rule out this concern through non-parametric event studies and placebo
falsification exercises.
2.3.3 Data
We use data from three different sources for our empirical analysis. First, we access the
public disclosure data from the FBR’s website. As we note above, this data set contains the
name, numerical identifier, and tax paid by every taxpayer in Pakistan for the tax years 2012-
2015. The data set for MPs includes the additional identifier of the constituency number.
Second, we utilize administrative data from the FBR. The administrative data include income
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tax returns for the tax years 2006 to 2012 (the FBR stopped providing researchers access
to tax returns after that) and a master register covering the whole sample period. The tax
return data contains all the line items in the tax return form. The master register includes
important taxpayer characteristics such as name, tax identifier, date of registration, and
taxpayer type. The last variable lets us determine if a taxpayer is self-employed, a wage-
earner, a corporation, or a partnership. Combining the administrative and disclosed data,
we are able to construct a panel of all taxpayers in Pakistan from 2006 to 2015.
Pakistan runs an elaborate system of what is called tax withholding. A tax remittance
responsibility is triggered by a number of transactions including wage payments. For some of
such transactions (not including, e.g., employer withholding), the withheld tax is treated as
the final discharge of liability. For example, income tax at the rate of 1% of the value is owed
on all export transactions. The remittance is due at the time the payment is received and
the withheld tax is deemed as the final discharge of liability: the taxpayer does not include
income from the transaction in computing taxable income, nor is he or she allowed any
refund or credit for the withheld tax. Tax payments reported in the disclosure data are the
sum of the tax paid on taxable income and the tax paid at source (called “final tax paid” in
the Pakistani tax code). We observe both these types of tax paid in the administrative data,
and are thus able to construct a consistently-defined variable that captures tax payment of
each taxpayer in all years included in the panel.
Table A.III presents summary statistics of our sample of self-employed individuals. Treat-
ment group comprises individuals whose Name Frequency does not exceed 40. We first com-
pare five moments of the distributions of taxable income, tax paid on taxable income, and
tax paid at source for the two pre-program years across the treatment and control samples.
In subsequent rows, we compare the mean of nine taxpayer traits across the two groups.
Traits in rows 4-6 capture the intensity of the program. Since the program was rolled out
electronically, taxpayers in cities with greater internet access were more exposed to it. On
the other hand, taxpayers with multiple businesses or with a business in a city different
from the city of residence were less exposed as linking the disclosed tax to the observed
lifestyle is harder in such situations. Rows 7-9 of the table explore variation in risk aversion
across the two groups. Early filers are expected to be more risk-averse, whereas men and
younger individuals are expected to be less risk-averse than their counterparts (Borghans
et al., 2009; Albert and Duffy, 2012). And finally, rows 10-12 compare the knowledge of and
responsiveness to taxation among the two groups.
Rows 1-3 of the table show that the two groups are fairly evenly distributed across the
taxable income and the two tax-paid distributions. But, as expected, taxpayers with more
unique names are different from the others along a few dimensions. For example, they are
62
more likely to reside in a major city and less likely to be male or old. In our empirical strategy,
these fixed traits are absorbed by the individual fixed effects. Table A.IV explores if condi-
tioning on these fixed effects removes the correlation between the treatment and the outcome
of interest. We estimate a triple-difference version of model (2.3) on the pre-program years
(2006-2011) only, pretending 2010-11 to be the post-program years. Clearly, the outcome is
not correlated with the name-uniqueness once the individual fixed effects are included in the
model. None of the triple-interaction coefficients in the nine specifications is significant at
the conventional level in either the complete or the balanced panel sample. To further rule
out the concern that our estimates are driven by differences in observables between the less-
and more-common-named taxpayers, we also report results from specifications that include
the full set of interactions between salient individual characteristics—region, gender, and
age—with the year fixed effects.
2.4 Effects of the Public Disclosure Program
2.4.1 Intensive Margin
Event Study—Figure 2.2 shows the results from the estimation of equation (2.4). We
restrict the sample to a balanced panel of self-employed individuals who file in every year
from 2006 to 2015. The figure plots the estimated values of the γjs from the equation along
with 95% confidence intervals. Panels A-D feature four different definitions of treatment as
indicated in the title of the panel. The first decile, first quartile, median, third quartile,
and top decile of the Name Frequency distribution are 4, 6, 76, 1853, and 6091, respectively.
Taxpayers in the first decile of the distribution, therefore, have literally unique names: their
name appears 4 times in 4 years of data. To accentuate the comparison, we drop the middle
part of the distribution in Panels C-D: second and third quartiles in Panel C and deciles
2-9 in Panel D. We also report the estimated coefficients γjs and standard errors for all
four specifications in this figure in a tabular form (see Table A.V). The results strongly
support our empirical strategy. There are almost no pre-existing differences between the
compared groups in terms of tax payments: for all the definitions of treatment, the γjs are
indistinguishable from zero for at least four of the five pre-program years. The tax payments
of the two groups diverge exactly from the time the program takes effect. This divergence is
sharp and persistent. It is also larger, the larger is the difference in exposure to the program.
For example, the relative differences in Panel D (bottom vs. top decile) are almost double
those in Panel B (below vs. above median).
All of the specifications show evidence of a dip in the treatment effect in 2013, the
second year of the program. Although we cannot test it formally, we believe that the dip
63
results from a mass media campaign launched by the Pakistani tax administration in 2014
to increase voluntary tax compliance in the country. The campaign began in mid-September
and continued till October 31st, shortly before the deadline to file the 2013 tax return (Cyan,
Koumpias and Martinez-Vazquez 2017).16 During the campaign, the administration took out
advertisements in television, radio, and newspapers and sent out mobile phone text messages
telling prospective taxpayers how easy it was to file taxes and how important doing so was
for national development. We feel that this campaign could conceivably have nudged even
the control group taxpayers to increase their tax payments, reducing the gap between the
two groups. No campaign of comparable intensity was launched in any other tax year.
Regression Results—Table 2.1 reports the regression results. We estimate equation (2.3)
on the sample of self-employed individuals using four different definitions of treatment. To
keep the control group fixed across all specifications, columns (1)-(6) drop taxpayers whose
Name Frequency falls between the upper bound of the treatment and 40. All specifications
include individual fixed effects and allow an unrestricted variance-covariance structure at the
individual level (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004).
One concern in our setting is that the public disclosure may change the composition of
the sample owing to the extensive margin response. Although the individual fixed effects
mitigate this concern, we rule it out even further by estimating each specification on the
balanced panel sample as well (even-numbered columns). Panel B provides a direct test of
the validity of the research design, estimating each specification on the pre-program periods
2006-2011 only. We define the last two years in these placebo regressions as the post-program
years.
The details of the regression results affirm the visual evidence presented above. The public
disclosure induces individuals with relatively unique names to report on average around 9 log
points more tax liability than others. This effect is statistically significant and remarkably
stable across all specifications. As expected, it drops slightly as we widen the treatment
window, allowing less distinctly named individuals to enter the treatment window, a finding
we explore further in the next set of results. Panel B provides evidence that validates the
empirical strategy, showing that the placebo coefficient capturing any pre-existing trends in
tax payments across the compared groups is trivial/insignificant in all specifications. This
indicates that leveraging the variation in exposure to the program based on name uniqueness
indeed isolates the treatment effect of the program.
The evidence we have presented so far is consistent with our premise that the program
intensity varies proportionally with the uniqueness of a person’s name. Table A.VI explores
16The tax year 2013 in our paper refers to the year that runs from July 2013 to June 2014. Cyan, Koumpias
and Martinez-Vazquez (2017) refer to it as the tax year 2014 in their paper.
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this idea further. We now use a more continuous definition of treatment instead of a dichoto-
mous one, exploring how the response varies across the Name Frequency distribution. The
placebo specifications in columns (3)-(4) illustrate that no systematic relationship existed
between the tax payment and the name of an individual before the program. However, a
strong relationship appears after the program (columns 1-2), with self-employed taxpayers
having more distinct names remitting significantly more tax. This effect is strongest at the
left tail of the distribution, containing the most unique names. It declines monotonically
as we move rightward and becomes indistinguishable from zero as the Name Frequency ap-
proaches 300. As we note above, we do not presume that taxpayers have a precise, objective
idea of how common their name is. But life experiences of persons with a very common name
such as Muhammad Aslam would have instilled subjective beliefs that their name affords
virtual anonymity to them. The results in Table A.VI show that this threshold is apparently
reached at about 300. Persons with such frequent names behave as if they are aware of
the objective reality that linking the disclosed information to them through their name is
virtually impossible.
In another check on our empirical strategy, we now show that no significant association
exists between the name and tax payment for the sample of taxpayers who are (i) well-known
and (ii) identified in the disclosed records through additional, publicly-known identifiers.
Table A.VII presents the results. We replicate Table 2.1, estimating equation (2.3) on
the sample of MPs only. Because MPs fulfill conditions (i) and (ii), we do not expect the
regressions to return significant DD coefficients. Reassuringly, the results are consistent with
our expectations: the uniqueness of the name of an MP is not associated with a significantly
higher or lower tax payment after the program in any of the eight specifications.
Another concern is that our definition of name commonness may conflate its true popula-
tion measure with the return filing behavior. For example, our definition of Name Frequency
assigns the same value to a full name appearing four times in a single year or once every
post-reform year. While this concern is mitigated by the fact that the distribution of names
in our sample is extremely stable across years (see Figure 2.1-B), we address it more directly
in Table A.VIII. We now define Name Frequency as 4 × the number of times a full name
appears in a given year’s data.17 Unsurprisingly, we obtain very similar results. In a related
robustness check, we use a local rather than the national measure of name commonness.
We define Name Frequency as the number of times a full name appears in the four years of
disclosed data in a district rather than nationally. District here denotes the district identified
by the first five digits of the numeric tax identifier (CNIC), which was published along with
17We multiply the number of occurrences of a full name in a given year’s data by four to make this
alternative definition more compatible with the one in our baseline specification.
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names in the 2013-2015 tax directories. The additional information hidden in the numeric
tax identifier could mean that even for people with the same names the degree of exposure
varies depending upon the district they live in. Table A.IX reports the result of this exercise.
The estimated response becomes stronger, although the difference from the baseline is not
large. This result is not a surprise for at least two reasons. First, the significance of the first
five digits of the CNIC namely that they identify the district the CNIC was registered in is
not commonly known. Second, the tax directories are in a PDF format and list taxpayers
in the alphabetical order. Looking for taxpayers of a given district is therefore not straight-
forward, requiring search for the five digits throughout the document. For this reason, it
remains true that the costs of linking an observation in the tax directory to a taxpayer are
higher the more common nationally their name is.
Summary statistics presented in Table A.III show that our treatment and control samples
are different along few dimensions. To show that our results are not driven by any difference
in observables between the two groups, we estimate an augmented version of our baseline
model (2.3). The augmented model includes the full set of interactions of three taxpayer
characteristics—gender, age, and region—with the year fixed effects, allowing taxpayers
with each characteristic their own time trend. These augmented models return qualitatively
similar but somewhat smaller estimates than our baseline results; compare the results in
Tables A.X, A.XI, and A.XII with Table 2.1.
Table A.XIII shows the results of our final robustness check. We estimate equation (2.3)
restricting the sample to self-employed taxpayers whose taxable income for the baseline year
(2011) falls in the window indicated in the heading of the column. This check addresses the
potential concern that taxpayers with common and uncommon names might be located in
different areas of the income distribution and thus would be subject to different shocks. We
have already shown in Table A.III that this is not the case, and that our treatment and control
taxpayers are distributed fairly evenly across the taxable income distribution. The results in
Table A.XIII confirm this. Even when taxpayers having baseline income within a window of
PKR 100k are compared, the tax paid by unique-named taxpayers goes up significantly after
the program relative to the others, although no such difference existed prior to the program
(see the placebo exercise in Panel B of the table). Another important finding shown in the
table is that the response declines as we move up the taxable income distribution, becoming
insignificant as the income approaches PKR 400k. This finding is consistent with the recent
theoretical literature that argues that large/high-income taxpayers have far less ability to
engage in tax evasion (see Gordon and Li, 2009; Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2006; Kleven, Kreiner
and Saez, 2016).18
18Existing empirical results are also consistent with these theoretical models. Waseem (2020), for example,
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Sign of the Effect of the Public Disclosure Response—Given the difference-in-differences
research design, our estimates in Table 2.1 represent the relative difference in tax payments
between less-common- and more-common-named self-employed that arises from pre- to post-
program periods. Under the assumption that the program had a trivial or positive effect on
the tax payments of more-common-named taxpayers, this approach delivers a lower bound
on the true effect. We have taken this assumption for granted so far but test it formally
now. This is worth checking because there is some evidence, especially in the psychology
literature, that the provision of information can sometimes backfire (see for example Schultz
et al., 2007). In our context, backfiring means that some individuals may start paying less
taxes after the public disclosure if they perceive that others are paying even less.
To sign the average effect of the program for the universe of the self-employed, we compare
their tax payments with those of wage-earners. The comparison is based on the assumption
that the public disclosure is unlikely to affect the tax payments of wage-earners given that
their income is third-party-reported.19 We estimate both our event study and difference-
in-differences models on the complete panel of taxpayers containing both self-employed and
wage-earners, defining the former category as the treatment group. The event-study model
(see Figure A.IV) shows that the preexisting trends of the two groups are not parallel: the
double-difference coefficient is declining—almost linearly—in the pre-program years. This
trend, however, reverses quite saliently in 2012, when the DD coefficient rises for the first
time, illustrating that the tax payments of the self-employed go up relative to wage-earners in
that year. This remains true if we drop less-common-named self-employed from the sample
(see Panel B of the figure). After 2012, the DD coefficient starts declining again but at a
significantly lower rate. The event study thus shows clear signs of a structural break in 2012.
Based on these results, we estimate a slightly modified version of our difference-in-
differences model (2.3) where we control for the preexisting trends by allowing a separate
linear time trend for each of the two groups. The result are in Table A.XIV. The first two
columns of the table report estimates from our baseline specification for both the complete
and balanced panel samples. The rest of the columns are structured similarly to the first six
columns of Table 2.1. We include a triple-interaction term in these specifications that cap-
tures the additional effect of the program on less-common-named taxpayers. Three results
finds that the evasion rate for the self-employed in Pakistan is around 74% at the bottom of the taxable
income distribution but reduces to 6% as the income approaches PKR 350k. Because the response to the
public disclosure program captures a reduction in tax evasion, it is not surprising that it becomes insignificant
at the higher income levels.
19Third-party-reported income, as we argued above, is substantially less amenable to misreporting. In
fact, Waseem (2020), uses Pakistani administrative data to show that the evasion of wage income in the
country in the baseline years (2006-2011) was less than 1%. With such a near-perfect compliance at the
baseline, the public disclosure is unlikely to affect the tax payments of wage-earners.
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in the table are noteworthy. First, the estimated double-difference coefficient is positive in
all specifications. This captures the average effect of the program on all self-employed in
the first two columns and the average effect of the program on the more-common-named
self-employed in all others. Second, the estimated triple-difference coefficient is also positive
in all specifications (it also has a fairly similar magnitude to what we estimate in Table 2.1).
This shows that the program has a stronger effect (around 12 log-points) on the less-common-
named self-employed. Third, the estimated double-difference coefficient is negative and the
estimated triple-difference coefficient is trivial in all placebo specifications. The latter finding
is particularly important in our setting, showing that the tax payments of less-common- and
more-common-named self-employed were evolving similarly in the pre-program years.
While the above analyses are based on stronger assumptions than those in our baseline
specification, the combined evidence from both the event study and DD model is, we believe,
sufficient to rule out any boomerang effect in our setting. The effect of the public disclosure
is clearly positive even for the more-common-named self-employed. This implies that our
estimates in Table 2.1, as we argued above, have a lower-bound interpretation.
Heterogeneity—Table A.XV estimates a triple-difference version of model (2.3), exploring if
the response varies across self-employed taxpayers with the nine traits listed in Table A.III.
The first three of these traits, as we mention above, capture program intensity. The results
are consistent with our expectations. Major-city residents with greater access to the internet
and hence to the disclosed data respond more aggressively; multiple businesses owners, for
whom there is greater ambiguity about their earnings, respond less aggressively. We do not
observe either the residence or business city for roughly one-third of the population and very
likely for this reason the triple-interaction coefficient in the second column, although of the
expected sign, is insignificant. The next three columns of the table explore if the response
varies with the likely correlates of the degree of risk aversion of a taxpayer.20 The results
of this exercise are inconclusive: all the triple-interaction coefficients are of the expected
sign but insignificant. The last three columns of the table look for any variation in response
across taxpayers with a varying degree of knowledge of or attention to the tax system or the
ability to game the tax system. We find no differential response along these margins.
Revenue Effects—How much additional revenue did the public disclosure program generate?
To answer this question credibly, it is important that we take into account response hetero-
geneity arising from variation in both taxpayer characteristics and treatment intensity. Our
results in Table A.XV show that the most important trait along which the response varies
20There is some evidence in literature that men and young are less risk-averse than their counterparts
(Borghans et al., 2009; Albert and Duffy, 2012). Similarly, individuals who habitually file their tax returns
earlier than others are expected to be more risk averse.
68
is the location of the taxpayer. Based on this result, we divide taxpayers into 16 regions.
These regions indicate the tax district taxpayers file their tax return in. We then estimate our
model in Table A.VI separately for each region. We only retain the top six Name Frequency
categories of taxpayers in the model as the response for other categories is not statistically
different from zero. This approach effectively divides taxpayers into 96 (16×6) cells based
on their location and treatment intensity. Combining the average estimate of the response in
each cell with the tax paid by individuals in the cell, we estimate that an additional amount
of PKR 29.2 billion was remitted in the post-program years as a result of the program. The
self-employed in Pakistan paid a total amount of PKR 412.2 billion of income tax in these
years. Thus, we conclude that the public disclosure caused a nearly 7% increase in aggregate
revenue paid by the self-employed—the average treatment effect of the program. Note that
the approach we follow assumes that the program had no effect on more-common-named
taxpayers. But this is clearly not the case as shown by our results in Table A.XIV. To this
extent, our estimate has a lower bound interpretation.
2.4.2 Extensive Margin
Event Study—Public disclosure can also encourage tax filing by individuals with less
common names. To probe this, we first present visual evidence. Figure 2.3 plots the log of
the number of self-employed filers in the treatment and control groups from year 2006 to
2015. We normalize the outcome variable in both groups to 1 in 2006 and track its evolution
in the later years. As earlier, we consider four definitions of treatment indicated in the
heading of each panel. To make the comparison more stark, we drop the middle portion
of the distribution in Panels C-D as we did in Figure 2.2. Plots show that the program
did result in more filing by less-common-named taxpayers. This effect is qualitatively very
similar to the intensive margin effect, although it is smaller in magnitude. The next section
formalizes this result using the regression framework.
Regression Results—Table 2.2 reports the results from the following regressions
log Ngt = α + β treatg + γ treatg × aftert + λt + ugt, (2.6)
where Ngt is the log number of filers of group g ∈ {treat, control} in year t. Columns (1)-(4)
are constructed similarly to the corresponding columns of Table 2.1, while columns (5)-(7)
correspond to the three specifications in Figure 2.3B-D. Panel B of the table conducts a
placebo exercise, where we estimate the above equation on the pre-program periods only,
treating 2010-11 as the two post-program years. Consistent with the visual evidence, none
of these placebo coefficients is significant at the conventional level, illustrating that tax filing
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was evolving similarly in the compared groups. After the program, however, the tax filing
of less-common-named taxpayers goes up relative to the more-common-named taxpayers.
The DD coefficient is statistically different from zero in all specifications, showing that the
program increased filing by around 1-2%.
In the above analyses, we measure the commonness of a name using the post-program
data. One concern with this approach is that the policy-induced increased filing by taxpayers
of a given full name can mechanically make the name more common. If it occurs for less-
common-named taxpayers, they would drop out of our treatment group defined on the basis
of fixed Name Frequency thresholds. This would mechanically increase the number of control
taxpayers and decrease the number of treated taxpayers in the post-program years, implying
that the extensive margin response we report above is underestimated. To address this
concern, we repeat our analysis using an alternative measure of name commonness. This
alternative measure is based on the distribution of full names as it existed in the pre-program
years. Figure A.V shows this distribution. Unsurprisingly, it is very similar to the post-
program distribution. Figure A.VI and Table A.XVI replicate our baseline results using
the alternative measure of name-commonness. As expected, the extensive margin response
is now stronger. This result shows that our baseline results underestimate the extensive
margin response and that the program could have increased filing by 4-5%.
2.5 Effects of the TPHC Program
Figure 2.4 provides non-parametric evidence on the effects of the TPHC program. The
sample for this diagram includes corporations, partnerships, self-employed and wage-earners.
We group taxpayers into 20-rank bins on the basis of their rank in year t. The upper bound
of a bin is included in the bin so that, for example, the bin denoted by 40 in the horizontal
axis includes the taxpayers ranked between 21 and 40 in each of the four categories. We
then plot the average log change in tax paid from year t to t+ 1 in the bin. To increase the
power of our analysis, we take the averages over three-year periods in Panel A and over the
entire pre- and post-program periods in Panel B. Because we are plotting changes rather than
levels, 2012 is the first post-program year in this analysis. If the program influences behavior,
the post-program curves should be significantly higher than the pre-program ones around
the cutoff of 100. The evidence in the diagram is consistent with this a priori reasoning:
the post-reform earnings growth curve features a clear bump at the cutoff, suggesting that
taxpayers located around the eligibility cutoff of the program do increase their tax payments
in order to receive or continue to receive the benefits of the program.
Table 2.3 formalizes this analysis. We estimate equation (2.5) on a sample of the top
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1000 taxpayers in each of the four categories. We define taxpayers in a window around
the eligibility cutoff of the program as treated, and look for any differential growth in tax
liability reported by them relative to other taxpayers. In line with the visual evidence, the
growth rate does spike up around the cutoff. For example, the DD coefficient in the first
column shows that compared to the others, the yearly growth in tax liability reported by the
81-120 ranked taxpayers was on average 17 log points higher in the post-program years than
it was in the pre-program years. This additional growth of 17 log points was sufficient to
take a 120th ranked taxpayer into the top 100 of the distribution for any of the post-reform
years, and thus corresponds intuitively to the notion that the response represents an effort
by taxpayers around the eligibility cutoff of the program to become or remain eligible. The
next columns of the table show that the response declines slightly as we widen the treatment
window, suggesting that the effect is stronger closer to the cutoff.
To establish that our DD coefficient captures the causal effect of the program, we need
to ensure that it is not driven by any differential trends resulting from, for example, rising
inequality at the top. We take three steps to achieve this. First, we re-estimate each
specification in the table by adding a treat× 1.(year ∈ {2010, 2011}) interaction term. The
coefficient on the term loosely captures any differences in the pre-existing trends across
the compared groups. It is small and statistically insignificant in all the specifications.
Second, we estimate our model on the pre-program period only (2006-2011), pretending
that the program occurred in 2010. These placebo regressions, shown in Panel B, always
return insignificant coefficients. Finally, we look for the effect of the program on very similar
taxpayers unaffected by it. Table A.XVII conducts this exercise. The treatment window now
contains taxpayers who are relatively far away from the eligibility cutoff of the program, on
whose behavior we expect the program to have no influence. The results confirm this. None
of the coefficients in the table is distinguishable from zero at the conventional level.
To increase the power of our analysis, we have so far combined all four categories of tax-
payers in our estimation samples. Table A.XVIII decomposes the aggregate response. We
now estimate our baseline specification (2.5) separately on the sample of top 1000 taxpayers
of each of the four categories. The results show that the aggregate effect we report above is
driven almost entirely by the behavior of corporations. Compared to the large and statisti-
cally significant effect on corporations, the program’s effect on the other three categories of
taxpayers is not different from zero.
These heterogeneous findings are perhaps not surprising. Of the four taxpayer types,
corporations are perhaps in the best position to monetize the goodwill offered by the pro-
gram. They can build their brands by advertising their status as one of the top taxpayers,
translating the social recognition into higher sales and profits. Table A.XIX evaluates this
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explanation by exploring response heterogeneity across firms. Strikingly, firms that are likely
to be more sensitive to their reputation—public-limited firms21 and firms engaged in con-
sumer sectors such as banking, food, and textile—respond aggressively to the program. In
contrast, firms that are foreign-owned, face inelastic demand (pharma), or do not operate
in the consumer sector (construction) seem unaffected. Although not all of the estimated
interaction terms are statistically significant, the overall pattern is consistent with both our
expectations and similar evidence from other contexts showing that big firms, in particular
those in the consumer sector, are relatively more sensitive to their public image, especially in
issues involving social responsibility and taxes (see for example Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009;
Bénabou and Tirole, 2010; Graham et al., 2013).22
Finally, we show that our results are not driven by any differences in observables across
the treatment and control groups. Table A.XX reports summary statistics of our TPHC
sample containing the top 1000 corporations, comparing thirteen outcomes/characteristics
across the treatment and control groups for the two baseline years. The comparison shows
that the two groups are different along few dimensions. For example, treated corporations are
more likely to be located in the three major cities of Pakistan than the control corporations.
For every such characteristic where the difference between the means of the two groups
is statistically significant in any of the two baseline years we run a robustness check, re-
estimating our baseline model including the full set of interactions of the characteristic with
the year fixed effects. The results are in Table A.XXI. Reassuringly, the inclusion of these
interaction terms, allowing firms with each characteristic their own time trend, does not alter
our results. The placebo specifications always return a negative and insignificant coefficient,
and the main regressions a positive, large, and statistically significant coefficient.
How much additional revenue did the TPHC program generate? Combining our results
in Table A.XIX with the tax paid by firms each year, we estimate that an additional amount
of PKR 19.6 billion was remitted by firms ranked between 80 and 120 in the post-program
years as a result of the program. This additional revenue is 1.5% of total income tax paid
by the top 1000 corporations and 2.1% of total income tax paid by the top 100 corporations
in these years. Taking into account any response heterogeneity does not make a significant
difference to these results. But the two estimates increase to 3% and 4.1% respectively if we
21Public limited firms are corporations whose shares can be bought and sold by the general public through
the stock exchange. They are therefore more likely to care about their public image than private limited
firms whose shares are not available to the public.
22One complementary mechanism driving the higher response by corporations could be the following. As
we note above, the personal benefits of the program such as fast-track immigration are conferred on the
CEO of the corporation. The burden of higher tax payments, on the other hand, falls on shareholders. If
the oversight by the board of governors is weak, the agency problem can also result in a situation where the
CEOs benefit at the cost of shareholders.
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consider a wider treatment window containing firms ranked between 50 and 150.
2.6 Conclusion
To mobilize resources, countries around the world are increasingly using programs that
make tax information public, shame tax delinquents, and positively recognize top taxpayers.
We analyze two such Pakistani programs to estimate their impacts on tax compliance and
revenue. In the first of these programs, the government began revealing the tax liability
reported by every taxpayer in the country. In the second program, the government began
acknowledging and honoring top taxpayers in the country. These programs can encourage
whistle-blowing, evoke shame and guilt, and inspire pride, promoting tax compliance. They
could, conceivably, backfire, especially if they induce a perception that others are even less
compliant.
We find that both programs elicited a substantial positive compliance response. The
public disclosure caused on average a 9 log-points increase in the tax paid by individuals
exposed to the program relative to the unexposed. The increase was larger the more intense
was the exposure to the program. We do not find any evidence of the negative boomerang
effect. The social recognition of top taxpayer also induced a substantial response. We find
that the tax liability reported by treated taxpayers in the neighborhood of the program
threshold went up by approximately 17 log-points. The average effect was largely driven by
taxpayers for whom the reputational concerns from tax payments were first-order.
That these programs produce significant response has important implications. It shows
that fear of detection and punishment as well as shame and pride may, in some settings,
be meaningful determinants of behavior that economic models need to take into account.
From a policy standpoint, the results show that public disclosure and social recognition of top
taxpayers can be effective enforcement instruments. These programs cost little resources, and
therefore can be a cost-effective complement to the other costly measures the governments
undertake to deter noncompliance.
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2.7 Figures & Tables
Figure 2.1: Distribution of Names
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Notes: The figure illustrates the distribution of full names in Pakistan. We define Name Frequency
as the number of times a full name appears in the disclosure data for the years 2012-2015. The
two panels plot the distribution of the variable. Each marker in panel A denotes the number of
individuals in year t whose Name Frequency falls in the interval indicated in the horizontal axis.
Panel B plots the fraction of taxpayers in place of the number. We treat all English variants of an
Urdu name as one.
74
Figure 2.2: Intensive Margin Response to the Public Disclosure Program
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Notes: The figure plots the coefficients γjs and 95% confidence interval around them from the
event study equation (2.4). We estimate the equation on a balanced panel sample of self-employed
taxpayers, who file in all years from 2006 to 2015. The definitions of the treatment and control
groups are provided in the title of each panel. For example, for Panel A all observations where
full name of the taxpayer appears at the most ten times in the four years’ disclosure data are
considered as treated; the rest of the taxpayers serve as the control group. The first decile, first
quartile, median, third quartile, and top decile of the Name Frequency distribution are 4, 6, 76,
1853, and 6091, respectively. For Panels C-D, we drop observations in the middle of the distribution:
the middle two quartiles in Panel C and the middle eight deciles in Panel D. The standard errors
have been clustered at the individual level. Vertical lines demarcate the time from which the public
disclosure begins to have an effect on the tax paid by individuals.
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Figure 2.3: Extensive Margin Response to the Public Disclosure Program
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Notes: The figure plots the log of the number of treatment and control self-employed tax filers
from 2006 to 2015. We normalize the log of the number of filers in each group to one in 2006 and
track its evolution in the next nine years. The definitions of the treatment and control groups are
provided in the title of each panel. For example, for Panel A all observations where full name of
the taxpayer appears at the most ten times in the four years’ disclosure data are considered as
treated; the rest of the taxpayers are considered as the control group. For Panels C-D, we drop
observations in the middle of the distribution: the middle two quartiles in Panel C and the middle
eight deciles in Panel D. Vertical lines demarcate the time from which the public disclosure begins
to have an effect on the tax paid by individuals.
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Notes: The figure explores the response to the TPHC program. We rank taxpayers in each of the
four categories—self-employed, wage-earners, partnerships, and corporations—on the basis of tax
paid by them in period t, group them into 20 rank bins, and plot the average log change in tax paid
from period t to t + 1 in the bin as a function of the rank in period t. Panel A takes the average
over three-year periods; Panel B over the entire pre- and post-program periods. The upper bound
of the bin is always included in the bin. For example, the bin indicated by 40 includes 21-40 ranked































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.8.1 Name Cleaning Algorithm
Identifying Potential Spelling Variations in Pakistani Names
Most Pakistani names are derived from Arabic, Persian or Turkish. Like Urdu, these
languages are (or were) written in variants of the Arabic script. As a result the spelling vari-
ations in Pakistani names arise mainly because of standard issues in transliterating Arabic
script into English.
The most common issue is the spelling of transliterated vowel sounds. As there are no
standardized rules for transliteration each vowel sound can be spelled in many different ways.
In Urdu, shorter vowel sounds are not indicated through separate letters. So, for example,
the name Muhammad in Urdu is spelled with only four letters - MHMD. In transliterating
the name to English there is considerable discretion as to what English vowels will be used
for the sound in each syllable. The first syllable can be spelled as M, MA, MO, MU, MUA,
MOU, MU; the second syllable as HAM, HUM, HOM, and the third syllable as MED, MAD,
MD. The various combinations of these syllables generates multiple spellings for the same
name.
In Urdu, some longer vowel sounds are indicated through specific letters. However the
spelling issue still persists in these cases because of a lack of transliteration rules. For
example the name Mehmood in Urdu is spelled with five letters - MHMUD. The added
vowel represents the “oo” sound as in “rude” but it can be spelled in English as either U
OO OU or UO.
Secondly, in Urdu elongated sounds or sounds that are repeated across syllables are not
indicated through double letters (as is often the case in English) but are also expressed
through accent marks. Again taking the case of the name Muhammad, the middle “m”
sound is repeated but spelt with a single letter in Urdu. In English the repeated sound can
be spelled as M or MM depending on whether the spelling is based on the Urdu spelling or
the phonetic sound.
So for a given Urdu name, the vowel and repeated sounds imply potential spelling vari-
ations which we use to identify variants of the same name.
Standardizing Full Names
The tax directory published by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) lists each taxpayer’s
full name. We combine the tax directories for all “Individual” taxpayers for 2012-2015 to
get an exhaustive list of all full names that have ever appeared in the disclosure data. We
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then split the full names, based on spaces or hyphens, into the different (given or family)
single names they constitute. This gives us a master list of all distinct single names in the
data.
Given the possible spelling variations we manually work through this master list to iden-
tify the English variants of the same Urdu names. By convention, certain spellings of names
have become more common and widely used. Each name variant is standardized to the most
common spelling used for that name in the data. After the spellings of the single names
are standardized we combine them back again to create standardized full names. The name
frequency measures we use in the analysis are based on these standardized full names.
2.8.2 Definition of Variables
1. Major city. The taxpayer reports an address in one of the three major cities—Karachi,
Lahore, and Islamabad—of Pakistan.
2. Business in other city. The taxpayer conducts business in a city different from
where he or she resides.
3. Multiple businesses. The taxpayer owns more than one businesses.
4. Early filer. The taxpayer files their return relatively early. The dummy variable takes
the value 1 if the taxpayer filed their return for year t before the median filing date for
the year.
5. Young. If the taxpayer is younger than the median income tax filer for the year t.
6. Buncher. If the taxpayer reported income at or within a window of ten thousand
PKR below any notch in the corresponding tax schedule.
7. Strictly dominated choice. If the taxpayer reported income within the strictly
dominated region above any notch in the corresponding tax schedule.
8. Revised return. If the taxpayer filed a revised return for the given tax year t.
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2.8.3 Appendix: Figures & Tables
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Notes: The figure plots Google Trends data for the monthly search interest in Pakistan for the
terms “FBR Tax Directory” and “Tax Directory” from January 2012 to January 2018. The data
is normalized by time and location and scaled on a range of 0 - 100 to compare relative popularity.
The data point with the highest search queries within the specified time and location is given a
score of 100 and other points are scored relative to it. Vertical lines demarcate the months in which
the tax directories were released. Directories for tax years 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 were released
in April 2014, April 2015, September 2016 and August 2017 respectively.
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Figure 2.6: Special Immigration Counter for TPHC Holders
Notes: The figure shows the picture of special immigration counter at the Allama Iqbal Interna-
tional Airport, Lahore. The picture was taken in the summer of 2018.
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Figure 2.7: Distribution of Names – Original Spelling
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Notes: The figure illustrates the distribution of full names in Pakistan. We define Name Frequency
as the number of times a full name appears in the disclosure data for the years 2012-2015. The
Name Frequency of 4, for example, means that the full name appears four times in four years
of data. The two panels plot the distribution of the variable. Each marker in panel A denotes
the number of individuals in year t whose Name Frequency falls in the interval indicated in the
horizontal axis. Panel B plots the fraction in place of the number. Here, we treat all English
variants of an Urdu name as distinct names. For example Muhammad, Mohammad, Mohammed,
and Muhammed are treated as distinct names.
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Notes: The figure compares the evolution of tax payments across self-employed and wage-earners.
We plot the coefficients γjs and 95% confidence intervals around them from the event study equation
(4). The equation is estimated on the complete panel of taxpayers containing both self-employed
and wage-earners. We define self-employed as the treated group. Panel A includes all self-employed,
whereas Panel B drops the self-employed with Name Frequency less than or equal to 10. Note that
the 95% confidence interval around the DD coefficient is so tight that it is barely visible. Vertical
lines demarcate the time from which the public disclosure begins to have an effect on the tax paid
by the self-employed.
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Figure 2.9: Distribution of Names – Pre-Program Years (2006-2011)


































































































Notes: The figure illustrates the distribution of full names in Pakistan, as it existed at the baseline.
We define Name Frequency as the number of times a full name appears among tax filers in the six
baseline years 2006-2011. We normalize this measure of Name Frequency by a factor of 4/6 to make
it compatible with the measure we use for all other results, where we measure Name Frequency as
the number of times a full name appears in the four years of disclosed data 2012-2016. The Name
Frequency of 4, for example, in this figure means that the full name appears six times in the six
years of data. The figure replicates the two panels of Figure I using this alternative definition of
Name Frequency.
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Figure 2.10: Extensive Margin Response to the Public Disclosure –Baseline Frequency
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Notes: The figure conducts a robustness check on our extensive margin result. We replicate Figure
III using an alternative definition of Name Frequency, measuring it as the number of times a full
name appears among the tax filers in the six baseline years 2006-2011. We multiply this measure
of Name Frequency with a factor of 4/6 to make it compatible with the definition used in Figure
III and our other results. We plot the log of the number of treatment and control self-employed
tax filers from 2006 to 2015. We normalize the log of the number of filers in each group to one in
2006 and track its evolution in the next nine years. The definitions of the treatment and control
groups are provided in the title of each panel. For example, for Panel A all observations where the
Name Frequency using our alternative definition does not exceed 10 are considered as treated; the
rest of the taxpayers are considered as the control group. For Panels C-D, we drop observations
in the middle of the distribution: the middle two quartiles in Panel C and the middle eight deciles
in Panel D. Vertical lines demarcate the time from which the public disclosure begins to have an
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.3: Summary Statistics
2011 2010
Treatment Control Treatment Control
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Taxable Income:
25th percentile 12.281 12.255 12.044 12.017
Median 12.560 12.516 12.304 12.255
Mean 12.505 12.459 12.306 12.248
75th percentile 12.723 12.680 12.554 12.497
90th percentile 12.899 12.766 12.766 12.612
2. Tax on taxable income:
25th percentile 10.271 10.244 10.091 10.070
Median 10.521 10.494 10.337 10.264
Mean 11.064 11.015 10.737 10.567
75th percentile 11.845 11.884 11.081 10.531
90th percentile 12.848 12.613 12.520 12.155
3. Tax at source:
25th percentile 9.502 9.517 9.287 9.259
Median 10.917 10.943 10.625 10.540
Mean 10.915 10.984 10.678 10.687
75th percentile 12.411 12.475 12.132 12.162
90th percentile 13.699 13.804 13.450 13.526
4. Major city 0.462 0.336 0.458 0.334
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
5. Business in other city 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
6. Multiple businesses 0.158 0.131 0.157 0.129
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
7. Male 0.919 0.986 0.924 0.986
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
8. Early filer 0.615 0.642 0.554 0.543
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
9. Young 0.545 0.507 0.521 0.485
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
10. Buncher 0.049 0.054 0.044 0.046
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
11. Strictly dominated choice 0.018 0.016 0.022 0.019
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
12. Revised return 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for the treatment and control groups of self-employed
taxpayers. Treatment group comprises individuals whose Name Frequency does not exceed 40. We
first compare five moments of the log of taxable income, tax paid on taxable income, and tax paid
at source distributions for the two pre-program years across the two groups. Rest of the rows
present the mean and standard error of nine taxpayer traits, all defined as dummy variables. The






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.5: Intensive Margin Response to the Public Disclosure Program – Dynamics
Treat: Name Frequency
≤ 10 ≤ Median ≤ First Quartile ≤ First Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4)
treat × 2007 -0.026 -0.015 -0.047 -0.065
(0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.019)
treat × 2008 -0.011 0.010 -0.001 -0.015
(0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.019)
treat × 2009 -0.011 0.007 -0.005 -0.023
(0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.020)
treat × 2010 -0.012 0.012 -0.004 0.002
(0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.027)
treat × 2011 0.012 0.022 0.020 0.017
(0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.030)
treat × 2012 0.071 0.090 0.118 0.145
(0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.030)
treat × 2013 0.035 0.051 0.064 0.067
(0.014) (0.012) (0.017) (0.028)
treat × 2014 0.080 0.114 0.144 0.141
(0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.029)
treat × 2015 0.091 0.121 0.158 0.188
(0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.029)
Observations 891,420 891,420 451,158 242,944
Sample:
Balanced Panel Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports the coefficients γjs along with standard errors from our event study
equation (4). These coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals around them are plotted in Figure
II. We estimate the equation on a balanced panel sample of self-employed taxpayers, who file in all
years from 2006 to 2015. The definitions of the treatment and control groups are provided in the
title of each column. For example, for column (1) all observations where full name of the taxpayer
appears at the most ten times in the four years’ disclosure data are considered as treated; the rest
of the taxpayers serve as the control group. The first decile, first quartile, median, third quartile,
and top decile of the Name Frequency distribution are 4, 6, 76, 1853, and 6091, respectively. For
columns (3) & (4), we drop observations in the middle of the distribution: the middle two quartiles
for column (3) and the middle eight deciles for column (4). The standard errors have been clustered
at the individual level.
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Table 2.6: Public Disclosure Response Across the Name Distribution
Baseline Specification Placebo Specification
(2006-2015) (2006-2011)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Name Freq ∈ (0, 50] × after 0.107 0.105 0.020 0.013
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Name Freq ∈ (50, 100] × after 0.067 0.069 0.014 0.003
(0.011) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016)
Name Freq ∈ (100, 150] × after 0.061 0.080 0.027 0.036
(0.015) (0.023) (0.019) (0.023)
Name Freq ∈ (150, 200] × after 0.050 0.046 0.029 0.034
(0.019) (0.029) (0.025) (0.030)
Name Freq ∈ (200, 250] × after 0.043 0.011 0.014 -0.005
(0.021) (0.031) (0.026) (0.032)
Name Freq ∈ (250, 300] × after 0.045 0.022 -0.014 -0.027
(0.022) (0.033) (0.028) (0.036)
Name Freq ∈ (300, 350] × after 0.047 0.086 0.032 0.042
(0.025) (0.038) (0.032) (0.039)
Name Freq ∈ (350, 400] × after 0.037 0.039 0.028 0.021
(0.027) (0.041) (0.037) (0.043)
Name Freq ∈ (400, 450] × after 0.035 0.017 0.017 0.029
(0.026) (0.039) (0.033) (0.041)
Observations 2,792,270 891,420 1,496,374 840,469
Sample:
Balanced Panel No Yes No Yes
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table explores how the intensive margin response to the public disclosure program
varies across the name distribution. We estimate an augmented version of equation (3), including
the nine interaction terms shown above. The equation is estimated on a sample of all self-employed
individuals. The control group in these regression are the self-employed whose Name Frequency
exceeds 450. The coefficient on each interaction terms accordingly captures the average additional
tax paid (in log points) by the self-employed with Name Frequency falling in the interval as a result
of the program. Columns (1) and (2) report the results for the baseline specification containing
periods 2006-2015, both for the complete and balanced panels. Columns (3) and (4) estimate the
specifications on the pre-program years only, defining the years 2010 and 2011 as the post-program












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.20: Summary Statistics – TPHC Sample
2011 2010
Treatment Control Treatment Control
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Taxable Income 18.389 17.005 20.505 18.506
(0.546) (0.140) (0.059) (0.092)
[0.014] [0.014] [0.000] [0.000]
2. Tax Paid on Taxable Income 17.165 15.847 19.434 17.403
(0.635) (0.149) (0.091) (0.097)
[0.044] [0.044] [0.000] [0.000]
3. Final Tax Paid 12.730 13.070 13.908 13.132
(1.023) (0.211) (0.605) (0.208)
[0.745] [0.745] [0.226] [0.226]
4. Major city 0.925 0.834 0.950 0.882
(0.042) (0.012) (0.035) (0.010)
[0.039] [0.039] [0.063] [0.063]
5. Early filer 0.700 0.707 0.625 0.528
(0.073) (0.015) (0.078) (0.016)
[0.926] [0.926] [0.220] [0.220]
6. Young Firm 0.375 0.548 0.525 0.518
(0.078) (0.016) (0.080) (0.016)
[0.029] [0.029] [0.929] [0.929]
7. Public Limited 0.450 0.335 0.825 0.555
(0.080) (0.015) (0.061) (0.016)
[0.158] [0.158] [0.000] [0.000]
8. Foreign Owned 0.075 0.050 0.100 0.067
(0.042) (0.007) (0.048) (0.008)
[0.559] [0.559] [0.494] [0.494]
9. Bank 0.000 0.004 0.050 0.029
(0.000) (0.002) (0.035) (0.005)
[0.045] [0.045] [0.555] [0.555]
10. Food 0.050 0.043 0.050 0.071
(0.035) (0.007) (0.035) (0.008)
[0.837] [0.837] [0.561] [0.561]
11. Textile 0.125 0.146 0.025 0.136
(0.053) (0.011) (0.025) (0.011)
[0.701] [0.701] [0.000] [0.000]
12. Pharma 0.075 0.015 0.100 0.023
(0.042) (0.004) (0.048) (0.005)
[0.154] [0.154] [0.111] [0.111]
13. Construction 0.125 0.111 0.025 0.053
(0.053) (0.010) (0.025) (0.007)
[0.802] [0.802] [0.280] [0.280]
Notes: The table presents summary statistics of our TPHC sample containing top 100 tax paying
corporations in each year. The treatment variable here denotes corporations ranked between 80
and 120 in period t . Each row compares the mean value of the variable across the two groups for
the two pre-program years. We report standard error of the mean in parenthesis and the p-value of
the test of equality of two means in square brackets. The definitions of the variables are provided
in Appendix 2.8.2 and Table 2.19.
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Table 2.21: Response to the TPHC Program – Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Main Regression (2006-2014)
treat × after 0.412 0.402 0.416 0.400 0.383 0.363
(0.115) (0.114) (0.115) (0.114) (0.114) (0.115)
Observations 8,329 8,329 8,329 8,329 8,329 8,329
B: Placebo Regression (2006-2010)
treat × after -0.387 -0.366 -0.392 -0.254 -0.360 -0.332
(0.225) (0.221) (0.224) (0.224) (0.219) (0.224)
Observations 4,554 4,554 4,554 4,554 4,554 4,554
Trait:
- Major Young Public Bank Textile
City Firm Limited
Trait × Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table conducts a robustness check on our TPHC program results. We report results
from an augmented version of equation (5). The augmented model includes the full set of interac-
tions of the dummy variable Trait with the year fixed effects. We report results for five different
traits indicated in the second-last row of the table. The definition of these traits are provided in
Appendix 2.8.2 and Table 2.19. Columns (1) reports results from the baseline specification. It is
the same as column (7) of Table 2.18. The other columns add interaction terms to this baseline
specification. Standard errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at the firm level.
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CHAPTER III
International Student Demand for Higher Education in
the US
Abstract
International students in the US are a mobile, high-skilled, and politically contentious mi-
grant group. Their incentives significantly differ from other migrants, yet there is little
analysis on the determinants of international student demand for higher education in the
US. I use exchange rate variations to analyze the effect of competing educational attainment
and employment incentives on the stock and flow of international students to the US. A
depreciation of the home currency reduces educational incentives by making US education
relatively more expensive but increases employment incentives by making US income rel-
atively more valuable. I find that the cost of education effect dominates. A one percent
depreciation of the home currency reduces the stock and flow of international students from
that country by 0.11 percent and 0.25 percent, respectively. This response is driven entirely
by international undergraduate students, whereas international graduate student enrollment
does not respond to exchange rate variations.
JEL Classification: F22, I21
Keywords Intentional students, exchange rates
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3.1 Introduction
Studies on migration often rely on the comparison of binary groups: migrants versus
non-migrants; foreign-born versus local-born; citizens versus non-citizens. However, these
broad categories may include diverse subgroups that have different decision and incentive
structures. Migrants broadly defined can include foreign-born naturalized citizens, perma-
nent residents, temporary workers, students, and refugees. It is important to parse through
these subgroups and study them individually, to better understand their incentives and bet-
ter inform immigration policy. This paper studies an important subgroup of temporary
migrants—international students.
International students are a large, mobile, high-skilled, and politically contentious mi-
grant group. In 2015 there were around one million international students in the United
States, the largest this group has ever been. This was also a 10 percent increase from the
previous year, making it the highest growth rate in the international student population in
the US in the past 35 years (Institute of International Education, 2015). Compared to other
migrant categories international students are highly skilled; they either have a college degree
(graduate students) or are in the process of acquiring one (undergraduate students). The
decisions of these students have important implications for debates in the migration and la-
bor literature: the impact of shocks in the US or the home country on migrant populations,
the home country brain gain/brain drain effect of high skilled emigration, the revenue and
student composition effects on US universities and the positive productivity or negative labor
market effects of high skilled immigration to the US. International students are also politi-
cally contentious because immigration critics argue that these students primarily migrate to
the US for employment and use their student status to bypass restrictions on employment-
based migration. Understanding the factors that affect the decisions of international students
is therefore central to understanding these debates.
This paper studies the international student demand for higher education in the US. I
analyze the effect of changes in relative price and home country income levels on the stock
and flow of international students coming to the US and how this effect differs by academic
level. I use exchange rate variations to analyze the competing educational attainment and
employment incentives of international students. A depreciation of the home currency re-
duces educational incentives by making US education relatively more expensive but increases
employment incentives by making US income relatively more valuable. In addition, I use
variations in GDP per capita to study the effect of changes in home country income levels.
I use student visa data from the US State Department and survey data from the Institute
of International Education (IIE) to create a panel of international student stocks and flows
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from 1996-2014. I find that a 1 percent increase in the exchange rate (a depreciation of home
currency) leads to a 0.25 percent decrease in the flow of international students and a 0.11
percent decrease in the stock of international students from that country. The higher relative
cost of tuition and living expenses as a result of the depreciation decreases the number of
international students coming to the US. This response is driven entirely by international
undergraduate students, whereas international graduate student enrollment does not respond
to exchange rate variations. A 1 percent increase in the GDP per capita leads to a 0.32
percent increase in the flow of international students from that country. This suggests that
US education for international students is a normal good with demand increasing as income
levels increase. I analyze the interaction of GDP and exchange rate shocks and find that
student flows from lower-income countries are more sensitive to exchange rate shocks. This
suggests that binding budget and credit constraints are an important factor of international
student demand for US education.
This paper builds on the literature that studies the impact of exchange rate and income
shocks on migrant outcomes. McKenzie, Theoharides and Yang (2014) study the impact of
destination country GDP shocks on migrant flows and wages. Yang (2006), Yang (2008),
Nekoei (2013), and Abarcar (2017) use exchange rate variations to identify effects on return
migration, remittances and labor migrant outcomes. Yang (2006), Yang (2008) and Abarcar
(2017) use exchange rate variations generated by the Asian financial crises, whereas Nekoei
(2013), similar to this paper, uses exchange rate variations over a longer time horizon.
Although this literature analyzes a range of migrant outcomes, the results in each case
are primarily driven by the relative income benefits that migrants receive from GDP shocks
or home country currency depreciations (relative to the destination/host country currency).
Yang (2006) and Abarcar (2017) find reduced returned migration, Yang (2008) finds higher
remittances sent home, and Nekoei (2013) finds a decrease in labor supply as a result of the
depreciation of the home currency. In contrast to this literature, I find that for international
students the cost effect of a depreciation of the home currency dominates. A depreciation in
the home currency reduces the number of international students coming to the US due to
higher tuition costs and tighter budget constraints. This result highlights how international
students as a subgroup differ significantly from other migrant groups and therefore warrant
specific attention.
There is a growing literature on the incentives of international students to study in the
US. Rozensweig (2006) proposes two competing models to explain international student
demand for education; a constrained domestic schooling model that is based on the lack of
schooling options in the home country and a migration model that is based on the increased
probability of international students finding employment in the US. In the paper closest to
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this work, Bird and Turner (2014) look at the effects of costs, home country opportunities,
and incomes on international student enrollment and show that Rozensweig’s two models
are not mutually exclusive. I build on this work by developing a model that incorporates
both domestic schooling and migration considerations. I use the predictions from the model
to explain my empirical findings.
Other work on international students focuses on the effects of international student en-
rollment. Bound et al. (2020) study the relation between university funding and international
student enrollment. They find that a decline in state appropriations to public universities
is associated with an increase in international enrollment showing that US universities may
rely on international enrollment to supplement their funding. Several papers study at the
effect of international student enrollment on domestic enrollment (Shih (2017) Shen (2016))
A common theme that emerges from the literature is that international students differ sig-
nificantly by academic level and program type and results are often not generalizable to all
international students. I also find a large difference in the response of undergraduate and
graduate students. The effect of exchange rates is driven entirely by undergraduate students
whereas graduate enrollment does not respond to exchange rate variation. I find suggestive
evidence that this difference is driven by lower out-of-pocket costs for graduate students.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the conceptual
framework to understand the decision of international students to study in the US. Section 3
describes the data and empirical methodology. Results are presented in Section 4, followed
by robustness checks in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
In this section, I present a conceptual framework of the decision of a potential inter-
national student to study in the US. The framework analyzes how international students’
demand to study in the US is affected by incomes and relative price. The student chooses
to study in the US if it generates a positive net return and if they can afford the cost of the
degree. These two conditions can be expressed as follows:
(




τUS + cUS,H + φH
)
> 0 (3.1)
αH ≥ τUS (3.2)
Keeping track of currencies is important in this framework as changes in relative price, are
induced by changes in the exchange rate. The subscripts denote the currency in which each
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component is measured; US and H represent US dollars and the student’s home currency,
respectively.
Equation 3.1 states that the net return from higher education in the US should be positive.
The first group of terms in equation 3.1 are the benefits of studying in the US; future incomes
Y , earned either in the US or in the home country. They are weighed by p, the probability
of finding employment in the US. This probability can be modeled as a function of various
parameters, for example, a student’s preferences or ability. However for simplicity, as it does
not affect the analysis here, I do not expand on the functional form or parameters of p.1
The second group of terms in equation 3.1 are the costs of studying in the US divided
into three categories; tuition costs, moving and living costs, and opportunity costs. τUS is a
student’s direct out-of-pocket tuition cost of attending school in the US. c represents all other
costs associated with studying in the US, such as moving and living expenses. Finally, φ is the
opportunity cost of studying in the US and depends on the student’s outside option. If the
outside option is employment in the home country, the opportunity cost is forgone income,
whereas if the outside option is higher education in the home country, the opportunity cost
is foregone benefits of this education.23 Considering both the costs and benefits, students
will choose to study in the US if the net return from this decision is positive.
The second condition is that students can afford a US education. Equation 3.2 is the
student’s budget constraint. α represents their (or their family’s) total wealth/savings. The
constraint implies that a student must be able to pay all associated out-of-pocket tuition
costs upfront. Said differently, students face a borrowing constraint where they are not
allowed to borrow for out-of-pocket tuition expenses. If the conditions in both equations 3.1
and 3.2 are met students will choose to study in the US.
This conceptual framework generates testable predictions about international student
enrollment. First, for any given level of future returns, students that face higher out-of-
pocket tuition costs will be less likely to study in the US. Higher tuition will decrease
the net return from education and more importantly, higher tuition costs will result in a
tighter budget constraint making it more likely that US higher education is not feasible.
Second, students with higher family wealth/assets/savings are more likely to study in the
1By modeling p as a function of education in the US, Rosenzweig’s migration model, where studying
in the US increases the probability of finding future employment in the US, can be incorporated into this
framework.
2The constrained domestic schooling model from Rozensweig (2006) can be incorporated in the oppor-
tunity cost. Students from countries with a limited number of high-quality higher education institutes will
have a lower opportunity cost of attending school in the US as opposed to those from countries that have
many high-quality universities.
3Other outside options, such as international education in other countries may also be incorporated in
the framework. This would only change the relevant exchange rate to consider for the analysis
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US. Again this effect operates through a looser budget constraint. Third, students with
higher opportunity costs will also be less likely to study in the US. A high opportunity cost
may be in the form of better employment or educational opportunities in the home country.
Finally, we can also analyze the effect of a change in the exchange rate. A change in the
exchange rate e, changes the value of all the components in our framework that are measured











An increase in the exchange rate (a depreciation of the home currency against the dollar)
has three effects. First, the cost of education in the US increases, as the relative price
of tuition and living expenses increases due to the stronger dollar. Secondly, the budget
constraint faced by students becomes tighter, again the relative price of tuition has increased
whereas the value of a student’s assets/savings has not changed. Lastly, the value of potential
future income in the US increases. This relative income effect is important because it is the
driving force in all the results related to the impact of exchange rates on migrants. For
international students, however, this relative income effect will be relatively small. Firstly
because it is discounted by p the probability of finding employment in the US. Secondly, the
potential income will also only be realized many years in the future, adding to the uncertainty
and further reducing its value. The overall result is that for international students, unlike
other migrants, a depreciation of the home currency will on net be a negative shock.
3.3 Data & Empirical Methodology
To test the empirical predictions from the conceptual framework presented above, I ana-
lyze both the stock and flow of international students in the US. I use administrative student
(F1) visa data from the US State Department to measure the flow of international students
to the US. The State Department reports the total number of student (F1) visas issued to
citizens of each country, in each fiscal year. All international students are required to have
a valid student visa to enter the US. To obtain a visa, the student must first accept an
admission offer at an accredited educational institution. The institution confirms the stu-
dent’s enrollment to the State Department by issuing the student an I-20 form. This form
must then be presented by the student to a US consulate or embassy when they apply for
a student visa.4. To obtain the visa students must also show that they have the required
4Canadian citizens do not require a stamped visa in their passport. However, their status as international
students is established and recorded by the State Department when they present their I-20 form at a US
port of entry
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resources and funding to pay for the program in which they have been admitted. Insufficient
(proof of) funds is grounds for visa denial. Each issued student visa, therefore, represents
an international student enrolled at a US university in a given year.5
Using administrative visa data to measure international student flows has two main
advantages over survey-based measures - first, visa statistics represent the universe of inter-
national students coming to the US, and second, the student status of these individuals is
directly and accurately observed. In contrast, survey-based measures of international stu-
dent flows often rely on demographic information to infer immigration status. International
students, for example, maybe identified using their place of birth.This strategy however
may produce biased estimates as foreign-born individuals may be naturalized US citizens or
permanent residents.
A drawback of the administrative visa data is that it does not identify students by
their degree type or academic level. Based on the conceptual framework and the literature,
the response of international students to relative price variations will vary significantly by
their academic level. To study the difference in response of undergraduate and graduate
students I complement the visa data, with data from the Open Doors survey conducted
by the Institute of International Education (IIE). IIE has been conducting this census of
international students in the United States since 1948. In the fall of each academic year, IIE
surveys campus officials in over 2500 regionally accredited institutions of higher education in
the US. Institutions report the number of international students currently enrolled by their
country of origin and academic level (Institute of International Education, 2015).
The IIE data, which I refer to as my total enrollment measure, represents the total stock
of international students in the US. Although this data is not the universe of international
students studying in the US, it provides the most comprehensive available statistics on
international students by country of origin and academic level. Enrollment is divided into
three categories; undergraduate, graduate, and others. Undergraduates include students
pursuing a bachelor’s degree. Graduate students include all masters, (MBA, LLM, etc.)
doctoral, and professional degree (JD, MD) students, while the ”other” category includes
non-degree and English language students. The ”other” category accounts for a very small
percentage of total enrollment and is excluded from the analysis. These academic level
categories, although insightful, may still include diverse subgroups. For example doctorate,
master’s, and MBA students are grouped in the graduate student category but they have
5In certain cases, an F1 visa may not represent a new student. A continuing student may be issued a
new visa if, the student is still enrolled in an academic program, their visa has expired, they have traveled
outside the US and need to return. Student visa durations are determined by reciprocity agreements with
foreign governments. Students from most countries are granted 5-year student visas, which means that most
student visas remain valid throughout a student’s degree program.
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very different incentive structures. Doctoral students have longer degrees but better funding
opportunities which translate to lower out-of-pocket expenses. Masters and MBA students
in contrast have shorter degrees but limited funding options. In addition, the opportunity
costs of students looking to pursue each of these degrees will also vary significantly.
To analyze international student demand I set up a panel of students from 90 countries
from 1996 to 2014. These countries account for at least 95% of international students in the
US in any given year.6 Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics for the panel. The average total
enrollment by country and year is around 6,700 students and the average undergraduate and
graduate enrollment are both around 2,900.7 The average number of visas issued is around
3,600. There is huge variation in enrollment with each measure having a standard deviation
much larger than its mean. The maximum for each measure also shows that the distribution
has a very extended right tail. Chinese students in 2014 account for the maximum value of
each measure; the number of student visas, total enrollment, undergraduate and graduate
enrollment.
The Open Doors survey also records the primary source of funding for all students. For
students that have multiple sources, it records the source that has the largest share. Al-
though the information is not split by country of origin, it still provides some insight into
how students vary by academic level. Table 3.2 shows the primary source of funding for
international students by academic level in our data. 80 percent of undergraduate students
are financed by personal and family funds. In contrast, less than 50 percent of graduate
students are primarily funded by personal funds, although it is still the largest funding
source for them. The difference between these two groups is mainly driven by US college
and university funding for graduate students. This matches the observation that universities
generally allocate a higher proportion of their funds toward graduate programs. Combined,
these two sources contribute around 85 percent of the funding for both graduate and un-
dergraduate students. The funding distribution suggests that undergraduates who are more
often self-funded would face higher out-of-pocket tuition costs.
The overall trend of international student flows and stocks is shown in Figure 3.1. Both
the total enrollment and the number of visas issued each year have been steadily increasing
over the past decade. These trends are not unique to this period. International student
enrollment has been steadily growing in the US over the last half-century. In 2015 there
were around 1 million international students in the US (Institute of International Education,
2015).
6Some countries had to be dropped due to missing data on exchange rates and other controls
7Undergraduate and graduate categories do not add up to total enrollment because of non-degree and
English language students
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Although the two measures trend similarly, the effect on total enrollment lags the number
of visas issued by a year. This is because of the timing of students obtaining visas and
starting their degrees. Visas are counted by fiscal year (October of the year to the following
September), and enrollment is measured at the start of the fall semester. This implies that
in the data, students starting school in a particular academic year are receiving visas in the
previous fiscal year. 2001 for example saw a large decline in the number of student visas
issued after 9/11. These represent visas issued from 1st October 2001 to 30th September
2002. The effect of this on total enrollment shows up in 2002, in the form of a leveling off of
total enrollment in the fall of 2002.
The total enrollment line can be broken down into undergraduate and graduate enroll-
ment. Those trends are shown in Figure 3.2. Undergraduate and graduate enrollment have
been similar throughout the decade, both growing steadily. Undergraduate enrollment saw
larger declines in the 2000s but it has also grown faster since then. The net result is that
the relative size of undergraduate and graduate enrollment is similar at both the start and
end of our panel.
These similar and stable overall trends hide significant heterogeneity at the country level.
To illustrate this Figure 3.3 shows the trends in undergraduate and graduate enrollment
of four of the largest international student origin countries. Among these enrollment of
Chinese and Indian students has seen very large increases in the past decade. The growth
in Chinese students has been at both the undergraduate and graduate level, in contrast, the
growth of Indian students has been almost entirely driven by graduate students. The bottom
panels include Japan and Germany, countries that have seen a decline in student enrollment.
Again the decline in German students has been at both the graduate and undergraduate
level whereas the decline in Japanese students has been mostly driven by undergraduate
enrollment. These examples show that at the country level, there has been a lot of variation
in demand for US education, which I analyze in the following sections.
3.3.1 Specification
I run the following empirical specification:
ln(STUDENTS)it = α + βln(ER)it + λln(GDP )it + ψXit + δi + γt + εit
The outcome ln(STUDENTS) is the natural log of either the flow (student visas) or
the stock (total enrollment) of international students from country i in year t. The two
main explanatory variables are the exchange rate and GDP per capita. Both directly come
out of the conceptual framework developed earlier. ER is the nominal exchange rate in
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terms of the currency of country i per US dollar. An increase in ER, therefore, represents
a depreciation of the home currency and an appreciation of the dollar. The exchange rate
is measured as the annual average exchange rate of each fiscal year, to match the visa
and student enrollment data time-lines. GDP is GDP per capita measured in the home
currency. X is a vector of time and country varying controls. Exchange rate, GDP, and other
macroeconomic controls are obtained from the World Bank, World Development Indicators
database. Country and time fixed effects are included to account for country and time-
invariant characteristics respectively. All variables are included as natural logs, allowing the
coefficients to be interpreted as elasticities. Correct identification of the coefficients in this
model requires the error to be uncorrelated with the regressors. Said differently, this requires
that any country and time-varying factors that affect international student enrollment and
are correlated with the exchange rate and/or GDP per capita should be controlled for.
Exchange rates are notoriously difficult to predict in the short run. They deviate largely
from expectations based on market fundamentals and are often best modeled as random
walks. For this reason, the effect of exchange rate variations is often well-identified in such
settings, which is also why they have been extensively used in the literature. Despite this,
there may be concerns that exchange rates and GDP per capita are merely proxies for
other underlying macroeconomic changes that could affect students’ decisions to study in
the US. To check for this I control for other macroeconomic indicators such as inflation and
unemployment and analyze if their addition has any effect on the coefficients of exchange
rate and GDP per capita.
International politics and US foreign policy are also important determinants of who gets
student visas to study in the US. Visa restrictions may be an important additional constraint
for potential students. Variation in the flow of international students may be a function of
varying visa policies. If these are correlated with other determinants of international student
demand our estimates will be biased. To address this concern I add a time and country-
specific ”Visa Regime” control. This is the log of all non-student visas issued to a country
in a given year. It is a measure of the total flow of people between the two countries and
thus captures other determinants of getting a visa, including political and social conditions.
3.4 Results
Table 3.3 shows the results for the flow of international students. The dependent variable
is the natural log of the number of student visas issued. Regressing student flows on only
the exchange rate generates a small insignificant coefficient as shown in column 1. The
coefficient on the exchange rate increases in size and becomes significant when GDP per
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capita is added to the regression in column 2. This shows that the exchange rate and GDP
per capita, both of which affect international student flows, are positively correlated. The
correct specification should therefore include both these explanatory variables. The signs of
these coefficients are as expected from our conceptual framework. A 1 percent increase in
the exchange rate (a depreciation of home currency) leads to a 0.25 percent decrease in the
flow of international students from that country. The higher relative price of tuition and
living expenses decreases the number of international students coming to the US. Whereas
a 1 percent increase in the GDP per capita leads to a 0.32 percent increase in the flow
of international students. This suggests two mechanisms; US education for international
students is a normal good with demand increasing as income levels increase, or this may be
evidence of budget and borrowing constrained potential students. Higher income levels loosen
the budget constraint increasing the number of international students for whom studying in
the US is now feasible.
The Visa Regime control is added in column three. The coefficient of Visa Regime is
positive, significant, and larger than the coefficients for both GDP per capita and exchange
rates. This is evidence that visa policy does play a role in determining where international
students come from. Adding Visa Regime as a control does not affect the coefficient on the
exchange rate, the GDP coefficient however drops to about half its size. This means that
our Visa Regime variable is correlated with GDP per capita. Visa Regime is thus capturing
a mix of visa policy and other factors promoting the flow of people between countries such
as income levels. Individuals from richer countries can afford more international travel;
confounding Visa Regime and income levels. Despite this, it is still informative to add Visa
Regime as a control to be convinced that our results are not being driven by visa policy.
In the fourth column, I add other macroeconomic controls including inflation and unem-
ployment. These are included to ensure that the effects we are attributing to the exchange
rate and GDP per capita are not being driven by other macroeconomic movements in the
economy. Adding these controls does not significantly change any of our coefficients of in-
terest, which supports our identification.
This specification can also be used to analyze the results for total international student
enrollment as well as undergraduate and graduate enrollment separately. These results are
shown in Table 3.4. The first column is the same as the fourth column in table 3.3 and is
presented here for comparison. In the second column I run the same specification on log total
enrollment. I find that all estimates have the same sign but are smaller in magnitude. This
implies that the stock measure is less responsive than the flow measure to both exchange
rates and GDP per capita. Change in the flow measure represents an increase or decrease
in new international students enrolling in US universities. In contrast change in the stock
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measure of total enrollment may either be caused by changes in the flow of new students,
or some response from international students already enrolled in US universities. The only
margins that currently enrolled international students have to respond are either choosing
to drop out or somehow changing the duration of their degree. The smaller coefficients in
column two suggest that there is limited scope for adjustment on these margins and the
main response comes from the flow of new students.
The main advantage of the enrollment measure is that I can analyze undergraduate and
graduate enrollment separately. These results are shown in columns 3 and 4. The striking
difference between undergraduate and graduate enrollment is the coefficient on exchange
rates. I find that the exchange rate effects are driven entirely by undergraduate enrollment.
For graduate students, the effect is small and not statistically different from zero.
Does the exchange rate effect on international enrollment vary by income levels? Based
on the conceptual framework the answer is yes. At high income/asset levels, the student’s
budget constraint is less likely to bind. As a result, exchange rate variation will only cause
a price effect, changing the net return from international education. In contrast for low-
income students closer to the constraint, exchange rate variation, in addition to causing a
price effect on the net return, may push students beyond their budget constraint. That is,
university tuition may become prohibitively expensive for these students. Overall this would
lead to exchange rate variation having a greater effect on international student enrollment
at lower income levels. To explore this question I add the interaction of GDP per capita
and Exchange Rate to my specifications. The results are shown in Table 3.5. Columns 1,
3, 5 and, 7 are the same as Table 3.4 and are repeated here for comparison. Columns 2, 4,
6, and 8 add the interaction term to each specification. To help analyze the overall effect
of exchange rates (combining the interacted and non-interacted terms), the bottom of the
table reports the magnitude and standard error of these effects at different levels of GDP
per capita8
For both the flow and stock of international students, the interaction of GDP per capita
and the exchange rate is positive and significant. As predicted by the framework, students
from lower-income countries are more sensitive to exchange rate variation. Overall in column
2, the exchange rate effect on the flow of international students remains negative and signif-
icant at GDP per capita levels one standard deviation above and below the mean. For total
student enrollment, the exchange rate effect is not distinguishable from zero when GDP per
capita is a standard deviation above the mean. Columns 6 and 8 show the result separately
for undergraduate and graduate enrollment. The results for undergraduate enrollment follow
8The interpretation of the coefficients on the non-interacted variables; GDP per capita and Exchange
Rate, are not intuitive as all variables are in logs
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the same patterns as total enrollment. Graduate enrollment however does not respond to ex-
change rate variations even at GDP per capita levels above or below the mean. Although in
column 8 the coefficient on the exchange rate is negative and significant and the interaction
term is positive and significant, the overall exchange rate effects computed at the bottom
of the table are all indistinguishable fore zero. The magnitude of the coefficients suggests
that the exchange rate may have an effect on graduate enrollment at the tails of the income
distribution but does not have an effect at and around the mean.
How can we interpret this overall lack of response of graduate enrollment? There are
a couple of plausible explanations. If the budget constraint for graduate students is not
binding, either due to low out-of-pocket tuition costs or high levels of assets/savings, the
price effect of exchange rate variation may be too small to induce a change in their decision.
In addition, if graduate students have higher potential future incomes, the exchange rate
effects may again be too small to cause a change in their decisions. As Table 3.2 shows,
there is evidence that graduate students are less likely to be self-funded, which suggests that
this result may be driven by lower out-of-pocket tuition costs. However, as I do not observe
tuition costs I cannot definitively test whether this is the mechanism generating the result. It
is clear however that as a group graduate students differ significantly from undergraduates.
3.5 Robustness
3.5.1 Alternate Specifications
To test whether the results are dependent on my empirical specification I run two al-
ternate specifications. In the first, I include quadratic terms for Exchange Rate and GDP
per capita. This is to test if a linear specification (as in the baseline results) is a good fit
or if a more flexible functional form with quadratic terms is needed. The results are pre-
sented in table 3.6. Again to analyze the overall effect of Exchange Rates and GDP per
capita, the total effect at the average levels of each variable is given at the bottom of the
table. Comparing the total effects at the mean exchange rate and GDP per capita to the
baseline results in table 3.3 I find that the Exchange Rate effect is slightly larger in the
quadratic specification (0.3 compared to 0.26), whereas the GDP effect is almost the same.
This suggests that although the quadratic terms are statistically significant for both these
variables, the total effect as estimated by a linear specification is similar to the estimate of
the quadratic specification and thus a reasonable functional form.
In addition, I also run a first difference specification. First difference specifications are
also used to control for unobserved heterogeneity at a unit level, in this case, the country
level. Although the relative efficiency on fixed effect and first difference estimators depends
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on assumptions about the serial correlation of errors, both fixed effects and first difference
estimators are unbiased if the strict exogeneity of the error term holds. Therefore a check
of this condition is to run both models and see if they generate similar estimates. Finding
different results would imply that either one or both specifications are biased, showing that
the exogeneity of the error term has been violated.
The specification is as follows:
∆ln(STUDENTS)it = α + β∆ln(ER)it + λ∆ln(GDP )it + ψ∆Xit + γt + εit
All variables are differenced and country fixed effects are dropped. Table 3.7 shows
the results of the first difference specification. The signs and significance of the results are
similar to the original specification results in Table 3.3 suggesting that our model is correctly
specified.
3.5.2 Lagged Effects
Another issue to consider is the relevant timing of the exchange rate variation. The main
specification uses contemporaneous changes to the exchange rate. However, it is plausible
that it may take individuals some time to respond to exchange rate variation. This would
imply that lagged exchange rate is the relevant explanatory variable. Secondly, the effect
of exchange rate variation may also be persistent. So an exchange rate shock may affect
enrollment in the current year as well as future years.
To analyze this timing issue I run the main specification with combinations of lagged
exchange rates included. The results are presented in Table 3.8. The exchange rate and
its lags are highly correlated, which increases the standard errors of our estimates. The
results show that the contemporaneous exchange rate has the largest effect and it is the
only effect that is significant in multiple specifications. I interpret this as evidence that the
contemporaneous exchange rate is the relevant explanatory variable for international student
demand.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine international students’ demand for higher education in the US.
I propose a simple conceptual framework for the decision of international students to study
in the US. The framework combines education and employment incentives proposed by the
literature to explain international student demand and generates testable predictions about
the response of international student enrollment. I then compare these predictions with my
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empirical results.
I find that a 1 percent increase in the exchange rate (a depreciation of home currency)
leads to a 0.25 percent decrease in the flow of international students from that country. The
higher cost and tighter budget constraint reduce the number of students studying in the US.
The results are entirely driven by undergraduate students. Graduates students, perhaps due
to lower out-of-pocket costs, do not respond to changes in the exchange rate. I also find
that higher income levels in the home country lead to a higher flow of international students.
A 1 percent increase in the GDP per capita leads to a 0.32 percent increase in the flow of
international students. This income effect suggests that students have budget and borrowing
constraints, which at low-income levels prevents them from being able to study in the US.
The response of international students to exchange rate shocks differ from other migrant
categories. While the literature finds that working migrants benefit from the increase in their
relative incomes, international students are negatively affected due to higher tuition costs
and tighter budget constraints. The result highlights that international students are a unique
migrant category with very different incentive structures. They should not be combined with
other migrant groups when developing or analyzing immigration policy as they are likely to
respond very differently.
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3.7 Figures & Tables
Figure 3.1: Trends in the Stock and Flow of International Students in the US
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Figure 3.2: Total International Student Enrollment by Degree Type
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Figure 3.3: Country Level Heterogeneity in International Student Enrollment by Degree
Type
127
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std Dev Min Max
Student Visas 3,653 13,728 58 274,460
Total Foreign Student Enrollment 6,678 18,309 175 304,040
Undergraduate Enrollment 2,841 6,895 96 124,552
Graduate Enrollment 2,912 9,498 46 120,331
Table 3.2: Funding Sources for International Students as a Percentage of Total Funding
(1995 to 2014)
All Undergraduate Graduate Other
Personal & Family 67.1 80.8 47.2 65.2
U.S College or University 18.9 8.2 37.7 5.8
Home Government/University 4.5 3.9 5.4 3.9
Foreign Private Sponsor 2.7 2.5 2.8 3.1
U.S Private Sponsor 2.7 3.2 2.4 0.9
Current Employment 2.3 0.3 1.7 17.5
Other Sources 0.8 0.3 1.3 2.0
U.S Government 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.3
International Organizations 0.5 0.3 0.7 1.3
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Table 3.3: Effect of Exchange Rate and GDP Variation on the Flow of Foreign Students
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Student Visas
ExchangeRate -0.0527 -0.253*** -0.262*** -0.265***
(0.0416) (0.0652) (0.0688) (0.0677)




Observations 1,679 1,679 1,679 1,643
Controls N N N Y
Country & Time FE Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Controls include Inflation, Unemployment
The dependent variable is natural log of the number of student visas issued
All regressors are also in natural logs
Table 3.4: Result by Student Academic Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
F Visas Total Enrol Undegrad Grad
ExchangeRate -0.265*** -0.110** -0.196*** 0.0218
(0.0677) (0.0489) (0.0533) (0.0502)
GDPpc 0.221*** 0.185*** 0.199*** 0.205***
(0.0529) (0.0366) (0.0452) (0.0355)
VisaRegime 0.366*** 0.230*** 0.294*** 0.213***
(0.0428) (0.0282) (0.0343) (0.0264)
Observations 1,643 1,643 1,637 1,637
Controls Y Y Y Y
Country & Time FE Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Controls include Inflation, Unemployment
The outcome variable is natural log of each measure
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.6: Checking Quadratic Form of Exchange Rate and GDPpc
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Student Visas
ExchangeRate -0.0996 -0.340*** -0.447*** -0.435***
(0.0643) (0.0753) (0.104) (0.107)
ExchangeRate2 0.0153*** 0.0102* 0.0203*** 0.0188**
(0.00586) (0.00520) (0.00709) (0.00738)
GDPpc -0.0243 -0.119 -0.0587
(0.0951) (0.0922) (0.0939)
GDPpc2 0.0164*** 0.0137*** 0.0124***
(0.00430) (0.00403) (0.00404)
Observations 1,706 1,679 1,679 1,643
Country Controls N N N Y
Country & Time FE Y Y Y Y
Total Exchange Rate Effect At
Mean Exchange Rate 0.00482 -0.270*** -0.308*** -0.307***
(0.0416) (0.0609) (0.0696) (0.0706)
Total GDPpc Effect At
Mean GDPpc 0.340*** 0.186*** 0.216***
(0.0511) (0.0492) (0.0505)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Controls include Inflation, Unemployment, VisaRegime
The outcome variables and regressors are all expressed in logs
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Table 3.7:
Alternate Specification: First Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ FVisas
∆ ExchangeRate -0.196*** -0.262*** -0.188*** -0.163***
(0.0539) (0.0580) (0.0567) (0.0539)
∆ GDPpc 0.251*** 0.144** 0.0601
(0.0619) (0.0608) (0.0657)
∆ VisaRegime 0.327*** 0.337***
(0.0497) (0.0456)
Observations 1,616 1,590 1,590 1,504
Controls N N N Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls include Inflation,
Unemployment
Table 3.8: Checking Exchange Rate Lags
(1) (2) (3) (4)
F Visas
ExchangeRatet -0.265*** -0.176 -0.201* -0.191*





Observations 1,643 1,643 1,624 1,624
Controls Y Y Y Y
Country & Time FE Y Y Y Y




Abadie, Alberto, Susan Athey, Guido W Imbens, and Jeffrey Wooldridge. 2017.
“When Should You Adjust Standard Errors For Clustering?” National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research.
Abarcar, Paolo. 2017. “The Return Motivations of Legal Permanent Migrants: Evidence
from Exchange Rate shocks and Immigrants in Australia.” Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization, 144: 62–77.
Akerlof, George A., and Rachel E. Kranton. 2000. “Economics and Identity.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 115(3): 715–753.
Albert, Steven M, and John Duffy. 2012. “Differences in risk aversion between young
and older adults.” Neuroscience and Neuroeconomics, 2012(1).
Allingham, Michael G., and Agnar Sandmo. 1972. “Income Tax Evasion: A Theoret-
ical Analysis.” Journal of Public Economics, 1: 323–338.
Ambler, Kate. 2015. “Don’t tell on me: Experimental evidence of asymmetric information
in transnational households.” Journal of Development Economics, 113: 52–69.
Ambler, Kate, Diego Aycinena, and Dean Yang. 2015. “Channeling Remittances to
Education: A Field Experiment among Migrants from El Salvador.” American Economic
Journal: Applied Economics, 7(2): 207–232.
Andreoni, James, Brian Erard, and Jonathan Feinstein. 1998. “Tax Compliance.”
Journal of Economic Literature, 36(2): 818–860.
Ashraf, Nava. 2009. “Spousal control and intra-household decision making: An experimen-
tal study in the Philippines.” American Economic Review, 99(4): 1245–77.
Ashraf, Nava, Diego Aycinena, Claudia Martnez A., and Dean Yang. 2015. “Sav-
ings in Transnational Households: A Field Experiment among Migrants from El Salvador.”
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 97(2): 332–351.
Baseler, Travis. 2018. “Hidden Income and the Perceived Returns to Migration: Experi-
mental Evidence from Kenya.” Working Paper.
Batista, Catia, and Gaia Narciso. 2018. “Migrant remittances and information flows:
evidence from a field experiment.” The World Bank Economic Review, 32(1): 203–219.
133
Benabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. 2003. “Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.” The
Review of Economic Studies, 70(3): 489–520.
Bénabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. 2010. “Individual and corporate social responsibil-
ity.” Economica, 77(305): 1–19.
Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2004. “How Much
Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
119(1): 249–275.
Bird, Kelli, and Sarah Turner. 2014. “College in the States: Foreign Student Demand
and Higher Education Supply in the U.S.” EdPolicyWorks Working Paper Series, 23.
Blank, Joshua D. 2014. “Reconsidering Corporate Tax Privacy.” New York University
Journal of Law & Business, 11: 31.
Bø, Erlend E., Joel Slemrod, and Thor O. Thoresen. 2015. “Taxes on the Internet:
Deterrence Effects of Public Disclosure.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
7(1): 36–62.
Borghans, Lex, James J Heckman, Bart HH Golsteyn, and Huub Meijers. 2009.
“Gender differences in risk aversion and ambiguity aversion.” Journal of the European
Economic Association, 7(2-3): 649–658.
Bound, John, Breno Braga, Gaurav Khanna, and Sarah Turner. 2020. “A Passage to
America: University Funding and International Students.” American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy, 12(1): 97–126.
Bursztyn, Leonardo, Bruno Ferman, Stefano Fiorin, Martin Kanz, and Gau-
tam Rao. 2018. “Status Goods: Experimental Evidence from Platinum Credit Cards.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 133(3): 1561–1595.
Castilla, Carolina, and Thomas Walker. 2013. “Is ignorance bliss? The effect of asym-
metric information between spouses on intra-household allocations.” American Economic
Review: Papers & Proceedings, 103(3): 263–68.
Castro, Lucio, and Carlos Scartascini. 2015. “Tax compliance and enforcement in the
pampas evidence from a field experiment.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
116: 65–82.
Center for Investigative Reporting in Pakistan. 2012. “Representation Without Tax-
ation.”
Chen, Joyce J. 2006. “Migration and imperfect monitoring: implications for intra-
household allocation.” American Economic Review, 96(2): 227–231.
Chetty, Raj. 2009. “Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight
Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance.” American Economic Journal: Eco-
nomic Policy, 1(2): 31–52.
134
Chiappori, Pierre-Andr. 1988. “Rational Household Labor Supply.” Econometrica,
56(1): 63–90.
Chiappori, Pierre-Andr. 1992. “Collective Labor Supply and Welfare.” Journal of Polit-
ical Economy, 100(3): 437–467.
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